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Preface
The 2016 presidential election has sparked an unprecedented
interest in the Electoral College. In response to Donald Trump
winning the presidency despite losing the popular vote, numerous commentators have weighed in with letters-to-the-editor, opeds, blog posts, and the like, and thanks to the revolution in digital
communications, these items have reached an exceptionally wide
audience. In short, never before have so many people had so much
to say about the Electoral College.
This remains a high-stakes debate, and historians, political scientists, philosophers, and other scholars have an important
role to play in it. They can enrich discussions about the Electoral College by situating the system within the history of America
and other societies; untangling the intricacies of republicanism,
federalism, and democracy; articulating different concepts of political morality; and discerning, through statistical analysis, whom
the Electoral College benefits most. In spotlighting the Electoral
College from various vantage points, this volume aims to empower
citizens to make clear-eyed decisions about it.
If one of this volume’s goals is to illuminate the Electoral
College, another is to do so while many people are still focused
on the topic. This project came together quickly. The entire enterprise went from conception to completion in a mere five weeks.
That swiftness was made possible by working with The Digital
Press at the University of North Dakota, which embraces a cooperative, transparent model of publication with the goal of producing open-access, electronic works that can attract local and global
audiences. Likewise, this volume came to fruition speedily because
the contributors agreed to pen brief essays in short order. As a result, while their works have the hallmarks of scholarly articles, they
do not constitute an exhaustive examination of the Electoral College. Indeed, many germane subjects are not addressed. Even so,
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these learned ruminations can enhance the ongoing debate about
the Electoral College.
Essays of this sort are much-needed, for the post-election dialogue about the Electoral College has been warped by partisanship. Republicans who reckon that Electoral College benefits their
party usually have defended the system. Conversely, Democrats,
smarting from the fact that in a span of sixteen years they have
twice lost the presidency despite popular vote triumphs, typically
have denounced it. This mode of assessment is unfortunate, for
it impairs our ability to analyze the Electoral College on its own
merits, as opposed to how it affects one party or another. Put another way, the Electoral College is an inherently political institution, but appraisals of it need not be invariably partisan.
To facilitate and expand the conversation about the Electoral College, this volume offers short essays that examine it from
different disciplinary perspectives, including philosophy, mathematics, political science, communications, history, and pedagogy.
Along the way, the essays address a variety of questions about the
Electoral College: Why was it created? What were its antecedents?
How has it changed over time? Who benefits from it? Is it just?
Should we alter or abolish the Electoral College, and if so, what
should replace it? In exploring these matters, Picking the President
provides timely insights on one of America’s most high-profile,
momentous issues.

Introduction
A Brief History of the Electoral College
Eric Burin
In 1787, Americans probably had more experience writing constitutions than any people ever. They had adopted the Articles of
Confederation during the Revolutionary War, and had penned
thirteen state constitutions, as well. Perhaps for this reason, it’s
doubtful anyone arrived at the Constitutional Convention thinking that the Electoral College was the way to pick a president.
Instead, the convention’s delegates identified three groups
that could select the president: Congress, state governments, or
the people. Some delegates (including, at one point, James Madison) favored a popular vote, but many representing slave states
or states with restrictive franchise laws objected. Consequently, a
good number of attendees championed the congressional option
(understandably so, since in most states the legislature elected the
governor). This plan nearly triumphed, but a last-minute attempt
by South Carolina delegate John Rutledge to privilege the more
populous states by having the president be picked by a joint ballot
of the Senate and House, when combined with a lingering desire
to make the executive branch more independent of its legislative
counterpart, derailed the proposal. Ultimately, the convention adopted the Electoral College and embedded it in Article II of the
Constitution.
Article II is among the most detailed parts of the Constitution and it can be found in its entirety in this volume’s Documents
section, but it’s worthwhile to highlight a few key features here:
Under this system, electoral votes were allotted to each state based
on the number of Representatives it had in the House, plus its
two Senators; state legislatures determined how the electors were
picked; each elector could cast two votes for president; and if a
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presidential candidate failed to get a majority of electoral votes, the
House of Representatives, with each state getting one vote, would
select the president and vice president from among the top five
electoral vote-getters. Several essays in this volume examine why
many founders thought this process for picking the president was
(to paraphrase Alexander Hamilton) if not a perfect system then at
least an excellent one.
After the Constitution was ratified, the Electoral College
underwent modifications. These changes were spurred by something the delegates at the Constitutional Convention hadn’t anticipated—the rise in the early 1790s of two competing political
parties, the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans. The
convention delegates originally envisioned the Electoral College
being comprised of knowledgeable and honorable men who, more
often than not, would forward to the House a list of commendable, broad-minded presidential candidates, each of whom enjoyed
some regional but not national renown. But the infusion of party
politics caused the Electoral College to misfire: In 1796, a Democratic-Republican, Thomas Jefferson, ended up serving as vice
president to a Federalist president, John Adams. In 1800, Jefferson and his running mate Aaron Burr received the same number
of electoral votes, causing a constitutional crisis that nearly led to
bloodshed. In response, in 1804, the 12th Amendment was adopted,
the most important feature of which was requiring electors to cast
separate ballots for the president and vice president. Thereafter,
presidential contests became more democratic affairs, essentially
morphing into popular referendums on party platforms and the
candidates who championed them.
The advent of partisanship also affected the way states selected presidential electors. Early on, most states invested state legislators with that power. But party leaders soon perceived the advantages of adopting statewide, winner-take-all systems (as a case in
point, Jefferson’s 1796 defeat could be attributed to three solitary
Federalist electors who hailed from states that were otherwise in
the Democratic-Republican camp). By 1820, the number of states
using the statewide system equaled those still using the legislative
system. Meanwhile, only a handful of states picked electors by dis-
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tricts. This was the method, Madison wrote in 1823, that the convention delegates had had in mind when they adopted the Electoral College, and consequently he called for an amendment that
would have required states to use the district system. Madison’s
proposal fell on deaf ears, and by 1836, every state except South
Carolina had adopted the statewide system. Even so, the sentiment
in favor of the district method never expired. In 1966, for example,
Delaware, along with eleven other states (including North Dakota), filed suit against New York, arguing that the latter’s winnertake-all system effectively disfranchised the less populous states.
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case, and like that
ill-fated suit, recent proposals to institute the district method, or
hybrid systems like those used in Maine and Nebraska, have made
little headway against entrenched political interests.
The collapse of slavery during the Civil War brought to
the fore another long-standing political dispute that affected the
Electoral College: Which residents should be counted when allocating House seats? Previously, slaveholding states could count
three-fifths of their enslaved residents toward their representation
in the House. With slavery’s demise, newly emancipated African
Americans, who at this juncture were not permitted to vote, could
now be counted as five-fifths of a person, meaning white southerners’ political power was poised to increase during the postbellum
period. The emergence in 1867 of Radical Reconstruction, with its
commitment to establishing an interracial democracy in the postwar South, resolved this issue, at least temporarily. The enactment
of the 14th Amendment in 1868 (which diminished a state’s share
of House seats proportionally to the extent to which it barred adult
male citizens from voting) and the 15th Amendment in 1870 (which
prohibited disfranchisement on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude) effectively granted southern states full representation in the House and the Electoral College on the condition that black men be allowed to vote. By 1900, however, white
“redeemers” had seized control of southern governments and disfranchised nearly all black residents with literacy tests, grandfather
clauses, and other ostensibly race-neutral mechanisms. As a result,
southern states could count African Americans when laying claim
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to House seats and electoral votes, even though such persons enjoyed virtually no political rights. Many of the redeemers’ methods were subsequently outlawed, but disputants still debate how
non-voters (such as legal and illegal immigrants, minors, prisoners,
and ex-felons) should be counted when distributing House seats
and—concomitantly—electoral votes.
The size of the House of Representatives also affects the
Electoral College. The Constitution provides little guidance on
the matter, only stipulating that 1) apportionment be based on
state populations, 2) every state gets at least one Congressperson;
and 3) each Congressperson represents no less than 30,000 residents. After the 1790 census, Congress passed a bill that called
for 120 House seats, but President George Washington issued a
veto—the first veto in U.S. history—with the result being that a
subsequent law established the number of seats at 105. Thereafter,
Congress almost always increased the number of House seats to
keep pace with population growth and the addition of new states
into the Union (though there were debates as to how exactly those
seats should be divvied up). In 1911, in customary fashion, Congress enacted another apportionment law, this time creating a
433-member House (with a provision that one seat each would
be added for Arizona and New Mexico when they became states).
Over the next ten years, immigration, migration, and urbanization
so altered the nation’s demographic landscape that Congresspersons who feared that the next reapportionment would diminish
their states’ political clout managed to prevent such a law from
being passed after the 1920 census. When Congress finally enacted
a reapportionment law in 1929, the new statute permanently fixed
the number of House seats at 435. Then and now, this cap hurts
the most populous states in the House, and by extension, in the
Electoral College.
The post-World War II struggle for greater inclusiveness
in America brought renewed attention to the Electoral College.
The most instrumental change concerned the 23rd Amendment, a
measure that allotted electoral votes to the District of Columbia,
which was home to 763,000 people. The bill passed Congress in
1960 with considerable bipartisan support, perhaps a reflection of
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the era’s democratic sensibilities, as well as the fact that it wasn’t
clear whether Republicans or Democrats would win those additional electoral votes. Thereafter, the measure quickly secured the
approval of three-quarters of the states. The District’s participation in the Electoral College serves as a reminder that many other
U.S. possessions are not treated similarly: In the 2016 election,
four million Americans (about as many people living in Wyoming,
Vermont, Alaska, and North Dakota combined), almost all of them
citizens, resided in parts of the U.S., such as Puerto Rico, Guam,
and the U.S. Virgin Islands, that were excluded from the Electoral
College.
That exclusivity, when combined with the Electoral College’s
inherently undemocratic nature, has produced results that, in the
estimation of some of the system’s modern critics, are nearly random, especially when presidential contests feature evenly matched
major party candidates and/or strong third-party candidates. For
example, in the 1968 race, a good showing by American Independent Party candidate George Wallace and slim margins of victory
in key states by Richard Nixon, left many—including Nixon himself—dissatisfied with the Electoral College. In response, Congress
took up the Bayh-Celler Amendment, the most serious challenge
to the Electoral College to date. This popular vote proposal passed
the House but died in the Senate at the hands some small states
and many southern ones, where disfranchised African Americans
could still be counted when allocating electoral votes. Thereafter,
Jimmy Carter’s rather contingent and fortuitous victory in 1976
and Ross Perot’s notable runs as the Reform Party candidate in
1992 and 1996 inspired additional calls for reform, as did George
W. Bush’s victory in 2000, in which he won the electoral vote despite losing the popular vote. Similarly, in 2016, Hillary Clinton
secured over 2.8 million more votes than Donald Trump, but the
latter triumphed in the Electoral College, thanks to narrow victories in a handful of swing states. Such quirks have always been a
part of the Electoral College. But in light of the 24th Amendment
(which banned the poll tax), the 1965 Voting Rights Act (which established federal protections to safeguard access to the ballot box),
the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the “one person, one vote”
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principle, and other advances in political egalitarianism, these anti-majoritarian and seemingly unpredictable outcomes are, from
the perspective of those who decry the system, disturbingly out of
sync with modern sensibilities. As proof, they note that in no other
contest do Americans employ anything like the Electoral College.
Even so, those who would alter or abolish the Electoral College have a difficult road ahead. Although the system always has
been subject to dispute, and opinion polls dating back to the 1940s
have shown most Americans preferring a popular vote for president, revising or discarding the Electoral College has proved exceedingly difficult. Moreover, in the immediate aftermath of the
2016 election, the Electoral College became a decidedly partisan issue: Republican support for a constitutional amendment in
favor of a popular vote plummeted to 19%, down from 54% in
2011. Furthermore, the 2016 election resulted in Republicans controlling not just the presidency, but also both houses of Congress,
33 governorships, and 68 of 99 state legislative chambers. Given
these attitudinal and political conditions, it seems almost certain
that the Electoral College will remain embedded in the Constitution for the foreseeable future.
Still, reformers have some cause for optimism. For starters,
they can point to the incremental progress of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), an arrangement wherein
participating states pledge to cast their electoral votes to the winner of the national poplar vote, regardless of the outcome in their
particular state. This proposal, which has the advantage of embracing rather than resisting each state’s right to determine the means
by which it selects presidential electors, would go into effect once
the participating states account for a majority of the 538 electoral votes available. As of 2016, ten states, plus the District of Columbia, had signed on. Collectively, they account for 165 electoral
votes—61.1% of the 270 needed for the compact to become operational. Those joining the NPVIC thus far have tended to lean
strongly Democratic, and there are good reasons to believe that
the compact’s supporters will encounter more resistance in swing
states (which may be unwilling to forego the outsized influence
they wield in the Electoral College) and Republican-controlled
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states (which currently oppose alterations to the system). Nevertheless, history shows that attempts at dealing with the Electoral
College’s alleged defects have made the most headway when it produces especially controversial results, and during periods of partisan tumult and realignment. Such appears to be the case today.
These circumstances, when combined with the American ethos of
advancement, provide reformers with a glimmer of hope, for as
Madison remarked about the means by which Americans pick their
president, “a solid improvement of it is a desideratum that ought to
be welcomed by all enlightened patriots.”
This volume reflects the notion that professional humanists and
social scientists have something substantive to offer “enlightened
patriots.” It is not intended to be a comprehensive survey of the
Electoral College, nor does it seek to dictate the terms of debate
about the system. Rather, it aims to add perspectives, arguments,
and historical evidence. In short, it provides timely, learned responses to one of the most consequential issues of the day, and as
such, it endeavors to foster thoughtful, civil discourse among an
engaged and informed public.
The essays in Section One put the Electoral College in comparative perspective. William Caraher examines how the political
institutions of ancient Athens and Rome foreshadowed the Electoral College. Donald F. Johnson explores the ways in which the
Electoral College mimicked the noble-dominated federal monarchies of early modern Europe. Manisha Sinha compares the Electoral College to the “rotten borough” system that existed in Britain until the mid-19th century. Andrew Meyer likens the Electoral
College to the mechanisms that China adopted to bind together
that vast and diverse society. These contributions allow us to see
the Electoral College in a new light by placing it side-by-side with
comparable political institutions.
The essays in Section Two investigate how the Electoral
College has shaped American politics historically. Andrew Shankman discusses the ideological assumptions that undergirded the
creation of the Electoral College, and the political realities that
prompted the ratification of the 12th Amendment. Patrick Rael
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surveys how the Electoral College affected southern political power before and after the Civil War. Cynthia Culver Prescott situates the Electoral College’s persistence within the larger story
of America’s halting progress toward equality. Timothy Prescott
uses statistical analysis to assess the historical relationship between
the popular vote and the electoral vote. These works permit us to
view contemporary disputes over the Electoral College against the
backdrop of the system’s long history.
Section Three features five essays that debate the merits of
the Electoral College from different disciplinary viewpoints. Philosopher Jack Russell Weinstein contemplates whether it is just
to have the electoral vote diverge from the popular vote. Communications professor Mark Trahant points to the rise of the
digital economy and egalitarian values when calling for reforms
to the Electoral College and other undemocratic political institutions. Political scientist Mark Stephen Jendrysik argues that
the Electoral College is an outdated system, and when it produces
anti-majoritarian outcomes, it invites a crisis of political legitimacy.
Another political scientist, Benjamin J. Kassow, warns that any
alteration to the Electoral College will necessarily entail important political tradeoffs. Historian Allen Guelzo and lawyer James
Hulme emphasize federalism’s virtues in defending the Electoral
College. Like the proverbial blind men describing different parts
of an elephant, each of these essays provide a distinct perspective
on the Electoral College.
In Section Four, Brad Austin reflects on how teaching about
the historical development of the Electoral College provides an
opportunity to cultivate empathy in the classroom. In some ways,
his contribution points toward the Documents section at the end of
the book. The documents, which are well-known and in the public
domain, invite readers to think for themselves about origins and
evolution of the Electoral College in the early American republic.

Section One
The Electoral College
in Comparative Perspective

1
Ancient States and Representative Government:
Greek and Roman Models for the Electoral
College
William Caraher
The framers of the U.S. Constitution looked to antiquity as an
inspiration for their own republic. The city-state of Athens during
its Classical efflorescence represented a model for democracy, but
it was not nearly as compelling as the Roman Republic alternately
celebrated by Enlightenment authors and English reformers. Both
ancient civilizations offered historical precedents for representative forms of government that allowed the architects of the various colonial and state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation,
and the U.S. Constitution to appeals to traditions of government
outside and older than the rule of the European aristocracy. Neither the Athenian democracy in its various forms nor the Roman
Republic offered an exact precedent for the Electoral College, but
both recognized the importance of recognizing regional interests
in the context of their popular institutions.
Democratic Athens of the 5th century BC, featured a popular assembly made up of all citizens which generally meant male,
property owners, of military age. This assembly met in Athens
to vote on whatever legislation that the state required. Over the
course of the 7th and 6th centuries BC various institutions served
the roles of the executive, generally an office called the archon, and
for a range of different judiciary functions. Most importantly for
our purpose here, there existed a council responsible for preparing
the legislation upon which the popular assembly would vote. In
the late 6th century, the Athenian politician Cleisthenes negotiated
a series of reforms in Athens including the creation of a “Coun-
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cil of 500” which would serve this function. This council included
50 representatives from each of ten tribes. Each tribe represented
communities from each of three non-contiguous regions in Attica,
the territory ruled by the city of Athens: the city, the coast, and
the interior. The goal of this arrangement was to ensure that each
region had representation in the Council of 500 and played a role
in the preparation of legislation for the popular assembly (whether
this is how this arrangement functioned in practice remains difficult to know). The organization of the Council of 500 around
territorially diverse tribes provided an important, representative,
counterweight to the popular assembly which tended to be biased
toward citizens resident in Athens or who could afford time away
from their field, businesses, or jobs to attend voting sessions. In
this effort to balance regional concerns with the direct democracy
of the assembly, Athens provides an early example of a representative council in the Western tradition. While the tribal basis for the
Council of 500 did not ensure each region distinct representation
within the Athenian government, it appears to have acknowledged
the diverse regional interests present in the Athenian state and it
recognized, at least in theory, that compensating for regional interests served as a kind of counterweight to the popular assembly.
Whatever the innovation present in democratic Athens, the
Roman Republic provided a far more compelling and influential
model for the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Rome, like Athens, did not have a written constitution to guide its governmental
structure, but we know enough about how it functioned from historians in antiquity. The Roman Republic possessed an array of assemblies and councils each with specific functions and advantages
to particular groups. Unlike Athens, there was far less emphasis
on the democratic, popular assembly and a fundamental commitment to the republican practice of voting blocks which represented
groups of citizens within Roman society. The two most significant
of these councils were the comitia centuriata and the comitia tributa.
In the comitia centuriata, Roman citizens were grouped into first
193 and then 373 centuries according to wealth. Each century was
a voting block and the majority of voters within the century decided the vote of that century. The wealthiest citizens were divid-
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ed into more centuries than the poorest giving them more voting
blocks. Moreover, the wealthiest centuries voted first resulting in
most elections being decided long before the poorest blocks voted,
although reformers consistently tried to shift the balance toward
the poorest voters.
The poorest voters tended to congregate in the city of Rome,
and this marginalized their political influence in other major assembly, the comitia tributa, which was organized according to region of residence. The city of Rome consisted of four urban tribes
whereas the surrounding regions, eventually expanded to include
all of Italy, comprised an additional 31. Each of the 35 tribes had a
single vote with the 31 rural tribes tending to represent the interests of wealthier, rural landowners. Like in the comitia centuriata,
the majority of tribes carried decisions in this assembly. In fact, the
politically marginal character of the urban tribes was such that a
punishment for certain kind of crimes included moving the guilty
individual’s tribal affiliation from a rural to an urban tribe to affect a kind of political disenfranchisement. Like in Athens, regional
concerns play a role in managing the political balance of the Roman Republic.
While neither the representative council in Cleisthenic Athens or the comitia tributa in republican Rome represented a precise analog to the Electoral College, the Electoral College and
the Roman assemblies shared the concept of voting blocks that is,
in some appraisals, central to the idea of republican governance.
For Rome, the comitia tributa also allowed for the state to expand
voting and citizen rights into newly conquered territories while
maintaining the privileges of the traditional aristocracy through
their control of the majority of tribes. While this may appear to be
a regressive tactic designed to conserve the political power of the
traditional Roman elite, it also allowed the Roman state to expand
political rights to new populations in ways that would have been
more politically risky for a direct democracy like in Athens. By
slotting new citizens into existing tribes or sequestering them into
a small number of tribes, the Roman elite also ensured the stability
of the state even during times of expansion.
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Today, political commentators like to look to Rome and Athens to predict or make sense of the American political trajectory.
This makes sense, of course, because the challenges faced by the
Roman Republic and the democracy of Athens allow for sensationally tragic presentations of our country’s political fate set amid
the fundamental conservatism of the republican political tradition.
Whether the U.S. will fail because of this adherence to these outmoded republican practices or find within them stability during
times of dynamic change is beyond the limited gaze of the historian’s craft.

2
The Electoral College as American Aristocracy
Donald F. Johnson
Although dedicated to creating a republic, for the framers of the
United States Constitution a stable aristocracy was essential to the
project of crafting a Federal state. Basing their ideas on enlightenment theory and the British constitutional tradition, Constitutional architects such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton
envisioned a strong, independent class of well-educated, wealthy,
independent men, who could mimic the function of European
nobility and act as a check on potentially tyrannical executives or
overly populist legislative assemblies. The Senate, meant to be a
republican version of the British House of Lords, was perhaps the
most obvious attempt at enshrining the interests of these wealthy
men in government at the national level. The Electoral College,
however, was crucial in creating a functioning local aristocracy
in America. And, unlike the Senate, it is one that has never been
democratized, maintaining to this day its connections to the monarchial governments of early modern Europe upon which it was
based.1
Indeed, if the Senate was meant to establish a national aristocracy, the framers intended for the Electoral College to maintain
elite representation at the state and local levels. The Constitution
prescribed no form of selection for state electors, and did not bind
On the importance of mixed government for the framers, see James
Madison, Federalist No. 40 and Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Nos.
23-28. For their Enlightenment inspiration, see Locke, Two Treatises on
Government (1689) and Montesquieu, On the Spirit of the Laws (1748).
On the Senate as safely fulfilling the aristocratic function in a mixed
republican government, see Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John
Jay, Federalist Nos. 62-66.
1

6

them to follow popular elections for president in any way. As the
Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist No. 68 demonstrates, the College
was meant to be a check on the excesses of the people, comprised
of wealthy men “free from any sinister bias” who would protect
the presidency from falling into the hands of “any man who is not
in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”
Hamilton, Madison, and other Federalists assumed that state-level
elites would act as a further check on the powers of the people
and of demagogues who might seduce them. Still, such a blatantly
un-representative feature seems out-of-place in a representative
form of government.2
This dissonance is because the Electoral College was based
not on republican theory but on the structure of aristocratic elective monarchies in eighteenth-century Europe, most notably the
Dutch Republic, the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, and
the Holy Roman Empire. In the Netherlands, representatives
from seven feudal provinces, each administered independently
by hereditary lords, gathered periodically to elect a stadholder,
or steward, responsible for leading the Dutch army in wartime,
administering foreign affairs, and resolving conflicts between the
provinces. Typically, stadholders came from the House of Orange,
which became the de-facto royal family of the Netherlands (and
whose most prominent member, William III, ascended the throne
of Great Britain in 1688). Nevertheless, through the electoral
system nobles of each province maintained autonomy over their
provinces.
In early modern Poland-Lithuania, nobles came together
from tens of thousands of sovereign fiefs to elect new monarchs
upon the death of a prior king. Meeting in the sjem, or noble Parliament, these aristocrats tended to elect members of prominent
families from among their own ranks, though elections could be
bitterly disputed and more than once led to schisms and civil wars.
Still, as in the Dutch Republic, the sjem ensured that nobles maintained power within their domains, and exercised supervisory authority over their executive.
For the selection of electors, see the United States Constitution, Article II, Section 1. For Hamilton’s analysis, see Hamilton, Federalist No. 68
in the Documents section.
2
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Finally, the Holy Roman Empire comprised perhaps the oldest and most well-known electoral college. For almost a thousand
years, seven to ten electors of various German and Italian states
comprising the Empire met periodically to elect a new Emperor,
who usually came from the Hapsburg dynasty of Austria. Despite
its seeming stability, however, electoral politics in the Empire were
fraught with religious and political intrigue, and prince-electors
(of whom George III of Great Britain, in his dual capacity as ruler
of Hanover, was one) exercised near total autonomy over their own
domains.3
The American Electoral College thus resembles more closely
those of noble-dominated Federal monarchies of late-eighteenth
century Europe than the British-style mixed constitution from
which the framers drew much of their inspiration. electors, drawn
from the elites of each state in the Union, would confirm not only
the integrity of the Presidency but also maintain the power of the
local aristocracies in each region of the country. Yet, while the electoral systems of the Netherlands, Poland, and the Holy Roman
Empire were destroyed in Revolutionary fervor during the 1790s
and 1800s, the American Electoral College persists in much the
same form established in 1789.
Indeed, the Electoral College continues to perpetuate a
regional American aristocracy. Unlike the Senate, which was reformed in 1913 to allow for direct elections, electors are still appointed by state legislatures and governors, and typically comprise
local elites. 2016 electors for the state of New York, for example,
included former President Bill Clinton, current governor Andrew
Cuomo, and current New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio.4 Given
its noble origins in pre-Revolutionary Europe and recent dramatic splits between the electoral and popular votes, perhaps further
consideration of its place in modern American society is in order.
For more on the composition of the Holy Roman Empire, Poland, and
the Netherlands in the early modern period, see Thomas Ertman, Birth
of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern
Europe (Cambridge, 1997).
4
“Duly Appointed Presidential Electors.” The Green Papers: 2016 General Election, accessed December 27th, 2016; http://www.thegreenpapers.
com/G16/EC-Electors.phtml.
3
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America’s Rotten Electoral College System
Manisha Sinha
Something stinks about the recent presidential election. It emanates from the country’s rotten Electoral College system for selecting the president of the United States. I use the term rotten
advisedly. America’s Electoral College in the twenty-first century
resembles Britain’s “rotten borough” system of electing members
of Parliament in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Not only
was the franchise restricted to an elite but “rotten boroughs” with
very few voters could elect representatives to Parliament like the
far more populous industrializing urban centers. With the Great
Reform Acts of 1832 and of the 1860s, Britain adopted universal manhood suffrage and did away with rotten boroughs. But the
United States persists in retaining its undemocratic and clunky
Electoral College.
When the framers of the Constitution devised the office of
the presidency as a republican stand-in for the British monarch
and indirect presidential elections through an Electoral College,
they did so as a check on democracy. Each state was rewarded the
same number of electoral votes as their congressional delegation,
giving small states that had equal number of senators as larger
states and slaveholding states that received greater representation in the House of Representatives because of the three-fifths
clause, greater electoral weight in the presidential elections. The
anti-democratic nature of selecting the president was amplified by
most states, which initially had their legislatures rather than their
voters select presidential electors. With the spread of Jacksonian
democracy, adult white men got the right to vote for presidential
electors except for one hold out, South Carolina until the Civil
War.
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Constitutional purists who want to retain the Electoral College must recall that American democracy has progressed through
constitutional amendments. The blueprint for presidential elections has proven to be one of the Constitution’s most inefficient
sections. One of the earliest constitutional amendments, the 12th,
clarified that electoral votes for the presidency and vice presidency must be distinct. The demise of slavery mandated by the 13th
amendment, and with it the three-fifths clause that gave slaveholders such a powerful say in government, made political representation in the United States more equitable. The expansion of
suffrage for African Americans and women through constitutional
amendments, the 14th, 15th, and 19th amendments and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 were important milestones in the growth of
American democracy.
The cumbersome Electoral College however has remained
in place, partly because its undemocratic nature has not been so
egregiously showcased as in the recent presidential elections. Before 2016, only four times in American history has the winner of
the popular presidential vote not won the Electoral College. The
most recent instance until this year was the contested Gore-Bush
presidential elections of 2000. But this year, the candidate who
lost the Electoral College, Hillary Clinton, won the popular vote
overwhelmingly, by nearly three million votes, the largest margin
ever for the loser of the Electoral College. These results discredit
the Electoral College system that weights voters in certain areas
more than others and makes many of the states in the heartland
and the South the “rotten boroughs” of today. It calls into question
the democratic legitimacy of the presidential elections. Over two
hundred years ago, American patriots rejected “virtual representation” in the British Parliament for self-government. That tenuous experiment in republican government has survived only by
expanding the boundaries of democracy. It is high time then that
we got rid of the rotten borough Electoral College system of electing presidents of the United States.

4
The South (or the North, or the West...)
Will Rise Again, and Again, and Again:
Viewing the Electoral College from the
Perspective of Chinese History*
Andrew Meyer
On July 20, 1842, during the Opium War, British soldiers and warships captured the garrison town of Zhenjiang, at the juncture of
the Yangzi River and the Grand Canal in the Qing Empire’s Jiangsu Province. When news reached the Daoguang Emperor (r. 18211850) in Beijing, he authorized his emissaries to treat for peace.
Though Qing resistance up to that point had been robust, the capture of Zhenjiang gave the British control of a fatal fracture point
in the larger imperial edifice.
With the Grand Canal blocked, little tax revenue could flow
from the southern reaches of the empire to the capital. Two-thirds
of the population of the Qing empire lived south of the Yangzi, and
the economic disparity south-to-north was even greater than the
demographic one. The per capita GDP of the agriculturally and
commercially rich southern Jiangnan region was nearly twice that
of more arid, sparsely populated northern districts like Qinghai and
Gansu. The revenue system of the Qing, which drew tax receipts
into the capital on the North China Plain, served as a wealth-transfer mechanism from the wealthy south to the impoverished north.
Disrupting that flow for any length of time could cause the precarious social contract holding the empire together to unravel.
*
A version of this essay appeared as Andrew Meyer, “The South (or the
North, or the West...) Will Rise Again, and Again, and Again: Viewing
the Electoral College from the Perspective of Chinese History,” Madman of Chu (blog), November 22, 2016, http://madmanofchu.blogspot.
com/2016/11/the-south-or-north-or-west-will-rise.html
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In the wake of the Opium War the worst fears of the Qing
government were realized. In Guangzhou (Canton) in 1837, the
young scion of a southern gentry family, Hong Xiuquan (18141864) had for the second time sat for and failed the imperial exams
that were the surest route to political, economic and social success.
The pass rates on the exams were extraordinarily low throughout
the empire, but the odds were made even worse for southerners
like Hong by the imposition of quotas favoring candidates from
disadvantaged northern regions. His rage and frustration at this
second failure induced a nervous collapse: he fell into a feverish
state in which he had prophetic visions. After the Opium War he
came to understand these visions as a divine calling and began to
gather followers. The movement that he began eventually threw
the Qing Empire into civil war, with large parts of southern China
breaking away to form the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom from 1850
to 1864. Unity was only restored after conflict that left as many as
20 million people dead and the economy of the empire shattered.
The Taiping Rebellion is only one (though admittedly among
the worst) of the many instances of cataclysmic breakdown experienced within the Chinese empire over the 2+ millennia of its history that were, in part, induced by inter-regional tensions and conflicts. Successive imperial regimes struggled to hold together an
expansive domain throughout which social and economic capital
was unevenly distributed. Though Chinese leaders developed and
maintained redistributive mechanisms to offset regional disparities
(for example, the quotas favoring northern candidates in the imperial exams), these were not generally elastic and responsive enough
to relieve the persistent centrifugal forces driving the component
regions of the empire apart. The problem, moreover, remains an
urgent concern today, as attested by the recent unrest over Beijing’s refusal to allow two secessionist legislators to be sworn in as
members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council.
This history poses lessons for those of us contemplating the
issue of the Electoral College in the wake of the 2016 election. Not
only has the Electoral College subverted the results of the popular
vote for the second time in less than twenty years, but the 2016
race has yielded an unprecedented disparity between popular and

13

electoral vote outcomes. Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by
2.86 million votes (a 2.1% lead) and lost the Electoral College by
74 votes (a 23% deficit). That the relative differential between the
two vote tallies should be so wide understandably creates a sense
of profound unfairness—the impression that the democratic will of
the people has been effaced by an arcane institution.
Though there will be renewed calls for the abolition of the
Electoral College, the historical experience of China should give
us pause to wonder at the wisdom of such a course. Like China, the
United States is a vast and diverse domain in which social and economic capital are unevenly distributed and the interests of different groups vary widely from region to region. The 2016 election
has starkly highlighted the regional tensions straining our social
fabric, with voters in the industrial Midwest and rural Appalachia
mobilizing to deliver an electoral result that radically undermined
conventional expectations. Donald Trump would not have won
this election unless poor- and working-class voters in states like
Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, North Carolina and Wisconsin had
defected from the Democratic Party in favor of his disruptive campaign, and that movement would not have resulted in a Trump
victory absent the auspices of the Electoral College.
This being the case, as predictably as there is and will remain
pressure to dismantle the Electoral College, there will be strong
resistance to any campaign in this direction. To understand why,
it is useful to contemplate what a presidential campaign would
look like if such contests were decided purely by the popular vote.
Candidates would focus almost entirely on the densely populated coasts to the exclusion of the interior, and on urban centers
to the exclusion of more sparsely settled rural districts. By giving
disproportionate leverage to more rural and sparsely populated
states, the Electoral College forces candidates to wage truly national campaigns and to float policies that can win the votes of
more marginalized citizens.
The 2016 election provides an object lesson in these redistributive dynamics. Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in California
by 4.26 million votes. Thus if one eliminates California’s total from
the national tally, Donald Trump wins the national popular vote
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by 1.4 million votes. This is a reflection of the fact that the Electoral College weights the popular vote of smaller and less densely
populated states heavily, such that a vote cast in West Virginia is
worth three times that of a vote cast in California. While that disparity might seem strangely arbitrary, to citizens in West Virginia,
which has a per capita GDP of $38,567, it no doubt feels very fair
that their votes should count more than those of their compatriots
in California, who enjoy a per capita GDP of $61,924. In light
of these facts we can see that in the 2016 election, the system as
currently constituted has (or at least will be perceived as having)
delivered a shocking victory to rural and industrial working-class
voters over coastal elites; one that they would never have achieved
in the absence of the Electoral College. For this reason, any move
to eliminate this institution will be perceived as an attempt at the
kind of “rigging” so loudly decried by the more acrimonious rhetoric of the recent campaign.
As votes continue to be counted and Hillary Clinton’s lead
in the popular vote widens, anger at the mechanics of the Electoral College will no doubt increase. In contemplating the situation, however, we must clearly understand that the elimination of
the Electoral College cannot be taken for granted as an obvious
“fix” to a quaintly arcane and obsolete institution. Reversion to
the popular vote to decide presidential elections is and would be
a drastically radical change to our larger social contract, one that
materially impacts the interests of millions of citizens and significantly redistributes power across the political terrain. There are
good philosophical arguments to be made against the “unfairness”
of the Electoral College, but the historical experience of China
demonstrates that there are likewise good practical and even ethical arguments on the other side of the issue. We must acknowledge
and account for all of the consequences of changing the current
system as we debate the issue moving forward, and undertake any
such discussion in a spirit of extreme sensitivity to the interests of
all groups that would be affected by any reform.

Section Two
The Electoral College
in Historical Perspective

5
What the Founders Were Thinking:
Why We have the Electoral College*
Andrew Shankman
Never in our lifetimes has the Electoral College commanded so
much attention. In arguing about what the Founders’ original intent was in creating it, and whether electors would defect from
their state’s popular vote, supporters and opponents of Donald
Trump have shown little knowledge of the Electoral College’s history. Both sides do not understand that the Founders’ Electoral
College quickly became a source of chaos, causing the nation to
abandon it fifteen years after ratifying the Constitution. The second version of the Electoral College that replaced the first in 1804
solved a destructive problem, but created a new and likely fatal one
that we have lived with ever since. Now that the electoral vote has
diverged from the popular vote in 40% of the elections conducted
during the twenty-first century, the problem is nearing a crisis. We
need a clearer understanding of the origins and history of the Electoral College to understand why it is contributing to our current
bitter division—and what we should do about it.
Created by the Constitution, the original Electoral College
worked like this: each state appointed electors equal to its number
of senators (2) plus representatives, apportioned at a ratio of 1 for
every 30,000 residents. Each elector cast two votes for president
and at least one of those votes had to be for someone outside the
elector’s state. If someone received the most votes and a majoriA version of this essay appeared as Andrew Shankman, “What Were
the Founders Thinking When They Created the Electoral College?”
History News Network, November 28, 2016, http://historynewsnetwork.
org/article/164514
*
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ty, he became president. The second highest vote-getter became
vice president. If no one received a majority, the decision went to
the House of Representatives, which could choose the president
from among the top five vote-getters, and had to make the highest
vote-getter vice president if they chose not to make him president.
To us these original procedures may sound insane; in 2016, they
would make majority vote-getter Donald Trump president and
Hillary Clinton vice president.
So, what were the Founders thinking? The Founders were
inspired by the classical republics of Greece and Rome and believed they had collapsed when they stopped seeking the public
good as their citizens divided into parties to pursue their own interests. For the Founders the public good emerged from a coherent
set of values, and understanding how to achieve it required a deep
knowledge of the classics, of natural law, common law, and the law
of nations, and of the new science of political economy that arose
during the Enlightenment. Above all, one had to possess disinterested virtue--putting aside personal interests for the sake of the
public good. The Founders thought that most citizens were not
capable of fully comprehending the public good. For the United
States to succeed, the small group of great and talented men who
could would have to guide them. Believing in a unifying singular
public good, the Founders saw no value in political parties. Parties
existed to promote competing interests, which was contrary to the
public good. Citizens either embraced the public good or they behaved selfishly and badly.
Only by starting with these assumptions did the Electoral
College make sense. After George Washington’s presidency, the
Founders assumed their Electoral College would routinely place
the decision of who would be president with the House of Representatives. They reasoned that the small group capable of comprehending the public good was evenly distributed geographically. A
reasonable number of them would stand for election. Each would
be equally qualified virtuous gentlemen. Without political parties
to inflame passions and mobilize voters into a few large groups,
only rarely would a candidate gain majority support in the Electoral College. The Electoral College would helpfully sort out five

19

from the larger group of the equally qualified, but usually would do
little more than that.
Yet almost immediately after ratification of the Constitution,
reality obliterated the Founders’ plan. Bitter divisions over Hamilton’s financial system and the French Revolution showed that
Americans violently disagreed with each other. By 1796 two political parties had formed to support or oppose the current course
of the nation’s domestic and foreign policies and to compete for
the presidency. Divided Founders became adversarial party leaders. With large regional, even national, voting blocks, it was suddenly highly likely that the leader of one of the two parties would
gain a majority in the Electoral College. The Electoral College
would now do what the Founders never imagined it should routinely do—determine the presidency. And the new president’s most
powerful critic, the leader of the opposition party, would likely get
the second most electoral votes, become the vice president, and
bring bitter partisan rancor into the heart of the executive branch.
This bizarre outcome happened in 1796 when Federalist John Adams was elected president due to receiving the majority of electoral
votes, and his opponent, Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson, became vice president. In 1800 Jefferson’s electors were so
disciplined that they cast each of their two votes for him and for
Aaron Burr, who they planned to make vice president. The result
was that both received the same number of votes while finishing
ahead of their Federalist opponents, leading to a prolonged constitutional crisis during which Pennsylvania’s Governor contemplated marching his state militia to Washington D.C. to prevent
anyone other than Jefferson from being inaugurated.
By 1800 democracy and political parties had made the
Electoral College an instrument of chaos. It led in 1804 to passage of the Twelfth Amendment, which required that electors stipulate a vote for president and for vice president. In abandoning the
Founders’ vision for the Electoral College, Americans were admitting that they did not live in the sort of republic where the Founders’ Electoral College made sense: one where virtuous gentlemen
pursued the singular unifying public good about which they all
agreed. In altering the Electoral College as they did, Americans of
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the early nineteenth century left us a hybrid and confused version
of the original. Requiring electors to vote for a president and a
vice president on a single ticket was a concession that party political conflict was never going away. Yet though political parties
and democratic conflict were now acknowledged to be the driving
force in American politics—that getting the most votes was what
mattered—those parties would simply have to trust to luck that
their votes were distributed in just the right way to gain an electoral majority.
Over time the Electoral College has become increasingly
dysfunctional. As the nation’s population grew, in the twentieth
century we limited the number of representatives to 435 to prevent the House of Representatives from becoming absurdly large.
The total number of electoral votes is capped at 538 (senators plus
representatives plus three votes for the District of Columbia) and
153 are distributed away immediately since all states must have a
minimum of three. The remaining 385 are distributed by population, which grows ever more distorting as the 385 total remains
constant while the population grows. In 2014 California’s population amounted to 66 Wyomings. Wyoming has three electors and
California 55. But to ensure that a vote from California counted as
much as one from Wyoming, California would need 199.
The hybridized confusion has led to our current schizophrenia. Trump supporters demanded that electors obey the popular
vote within their states. At the state level the popular vote must
be respected so that at the national level the popular vote can be
ignored. This selective devotion to the popular vote is a legacy of
the confusion that resulted when the Founders created an institution that made sense only for conditions that it quickly turned out
did not exist. In 1803 Americans merged the Electoral College,
an institution that only made sense in a world without partisanship and organized political parties, with a political process and
a political culture based on partisan conflict organized by political parties. Rather than allow chronic chaos in their Republic, the
Americans of 1803 abandoned the Founders’ Electoral College. To
avoid chronic chaos in our Republic, we must abandon the Electoral College entirely.

6
Did Disenfranchisement Give the South an
Electoral Advantage?*
Patrick Rael
There has been much recent discussion of the three-fifths clause
of the Constitution,1 which boosted slaveholding states’ representation in the Electoral College by including for apportionment a
population that received no benefits from government. Scholars
have debated how this influenced national politics under slavery,
but this conversation applies to the post-emancipation world as
well.2
Let us start in 1860. With the three-fifths clause operating,
the slaveholding states controlled 120 of 303 electoral votes (EV),
or 40%. The free states desired a “0/5” scenario, in which slaveholding states received no representation benefit for the enslaved
population. In this case, the South would have controlled only
35% of all EV. In 1860, the three-fifths clause thus gave the South
a substantial 5% bump.3
A version of this essay appeared as Patrick Rael, “Did Disenfranchisement Give the South an Electoral Advantage?” Journal of the Civil
War Era (blog), December 13, 2016, http://journalofthecivilwarera.
org/2016/12/disenfranchisement-give-south-electoral-advantage/.
1
For a brief summary see: Wikipedia contributors, “Three-Fifths Compromise,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Accessed December 31, 2016.
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Three-Fifths_Compromise&oldid=754867751.
2
See, for example, “Slavery, Democracy, and the Racialized Roots of the
Electoral College,” AAIHS (November 14, 2016); “Is slavery the reason
for the Electoral College?” CNN.com (November 22, 2016); “Yes, The
Electoral College Really Is A Vestige Of Slavery. It’s Time To Get Rid
Of It.” WGBH News (December 6, 2016).
3
All figures based on my analysis of data from Historical Statistics of the
*
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Under the South’s desired “5/5” scenario — the one in which
all slaves counted for representation — the South would have controlled 42% of all EV. That is a more modest bump of 2% (about 7
EV) over what it actually enjoyed under the 3/5 ratio.
Emancipation enhanced the South’s share of national power by propelling 3.9 million former slaves into the ranks of the
population used as a basis for apportionment. With slavery gone,
each former bondsperson would now be counted as a whole person
rather than three-fifths of one. In principle, this was a “5/5” scenario, in which all people (former slaves among them) were considered for purposes of representation.
In the 1872 election cycle, which was the first to rely on
post-emancipation census figures, the South controlled 138 of 366
(38%) EV. Had former slaves not been included (a “0/5” scenario),
the South would have controlled only 90 of 319 (29%) EV. The
emancipated freedpeople thus gave the South a 9% bump in representation in the Electoral College.
It was good that emancipation boosted southern political power so long as those added to the apportionment population had access to the political process through the 14th and 15th
Amendments, which granted citizenship to African Americans, and
the franchise to black men. But under conditions of complete disfranchisement, which southern states came close to making around
the turn of the 20th century, no African Americans received direct
representation in Congress.4 At that point, emancipation’s boost in
United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition, Susan B.
Carter, Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead,
Richard Sutch, and Gavin Wright, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); “Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research. Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: the
United States, 1790-1970 (ICPSR 3),” [Computer file] (Ann Arbor, MI:
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 197?).
A note of caution: there are many ways of building counterfactual scenarios with these numbers. I have made some plausible but not airtight
assumptions, such as that the apportionment basis for each cycle would
not change despite having fewer people in the apportionment population. Bottom line: republish these numbers at your own risk.
4
Absolute disfranchisement was the goal, but it was rarely complete.
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Southern power worked (some might say ironically) against African Americans, who struggled against racist state regimes whose
disproportionate strength in national government blacks’ presence
was artificially inflating. Imagine trying to get federal anti-lynching legislation passed against Southern states that had worked to
remove blacks from the voting population, and were stronger than
they should’ve been because of it.
By 1900, African Americans were being largely expelled from
the political process. Their concerns went unrepresented, and yet
their numbers still boosted Southern representation in the Electoral College. Effectively, the country ran on the “5/5” principle
even though the reality was that close to “0/5” of blacks could vote
for their own representatives.
In slavery, this desire had resulted in the diminishment of
Southern power. At the constitutional convention in 1787, representatives from northern states had bargained the South down to
counting only three-fifths of each slave for representation. After
the war, Republicans had sought to carry this principle into freedom by Section 2 of the 14th Amendment, which provided for the
diminishment of a state’s enumerated population in proportion to
the proportion of voters it disenfranchised. That failed, though, as
did the 15th Amendment’s voting protections, when the Supreme
Court began (from the 1870s on) permitting ostensibly race-neutral but intentionally race-specific disfranchisement measures. This
gave white supremacists the best of both worlds — they received
the enhanced political power that went with a larger population,
without the obligation to serve that population.
The numbers for 1900 bear this out. In the “5/5” reality,
the states that had held slaves in 1860 (“the South”) had 159 EV,
or 35% of the total. Under a “0/5” scenario, in which the South
would lose representation for the blacks it refused to enfranchise,
the South would have had only 112 EV, or 28% of a smaller House.
The South thus gained a lot from disenfranchisement. At the
turn of the century, its largely disenfranchised African Americans
gave it a 7% bump in the Electoral College, which was one even
I make no claims here about how many were actually disenfranchised.
This is about hypothetical extremes.
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Information from Susan B. Carter et al., eds., Historical Statistics of the
United States, Earliest Times to the Present: Millennial Edition (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2006).

larger than the 4-5% bump the three-fifths clause usually gave under slavery. And, as before the war, this was a population included
only to boost representation, for it could make virtually no claim
on the political process at all.
The Electoral College has always provided the ruleset for
selecting the President of the United States. The framers of the
Constitution hoped that this membrane between the voters and
the office of President would insulate the electoral process from
the “heats and ferments” of public opinion, as Alexander Hamilton put it in Federalist No. 68.5 But the cost has been high, for
anti-democratic politicians have always been willing to game the
system. One might have thought that ending slavery would have
ended the compromise embodied in the three-fifths clause — a
system that John Quincy Adams came to call “morally and politically vicious.”6 It was not to be. Of the many paradoxes to the
5
6

James Madison, Federalist No.68, see the Documents section.

Josiah Quincy, Memoir of the Life of John Quincy Adams (Boston: Crosby, Nichols, Lee and Co., 1860), 108-9.
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“freedom” that followed slavery, one of the most neglected may be
this: in the era of Jim Crow, ending slavery only made the white
South stronger.

7
Citizenship, Civil Rights, and Electoral Politics
Cynthia Culver Prescott
The United States is a democratic meritocracy. Or so we like to
believe. While the general trajectory has been toward greater political and social equality, progress has been uneven. Government
policies have made the American dream open to many, while disadvantaging or deliberately excluding others. The American West
has long been imagined as land of rugged egalitarianism, but white
settlement actually exacerbated inequality in important ways. Although the U.S. has had an egalitarian streak since its founding,
Americans have also deep reservations about sharing power equitably. This enduring tension between egalitarianism and deep-seated
distrust of the American people may help explain the resilience of
the remarkably undemocratic Electoral College.
In the decades following our nation’s founding, many people
residing within the boundaries of the United States did not qualify
as citizens entrusted with the vote. Property laws and poll taxes ensured that only the worthiest – read: wealthiest and whitest – men
could vote. white women were counted for representation purposes in the legislature and the Electoral College, but they could not
vote. Under coverture, married women’s legal personhood was absorbed by her husband. Native Americans and African Americans,
among others, enjoyed few rights. And, of course, slaves were only
counted as three-fifths of a person for representation purposes, and
were treated as chattel rather than as citizens with political rights.
Over the past two hundred years, our nation has expanded
the privileges of citizenship to more and more Americans. African Americans gained citizenship in 1868 and Native Americans in
1924. Women gained the right to vote in 1920. African American
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suffrage was enshrined in the Constitution in 1870; nearly a century later, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 removed legal barriers
against Blacks exercising the franchise. We have made our representative democracy more direct over the past two centuries, particularly through the direct election of senators (1913). Initiative,
referendum and recall powers were also introduced in many states
during the early twentieth century.
Viewed in this context of expanding political rights and
greater power for American voters, the Electoral College system
appears anachronistic. But our nation’s path toward inclusivity has
not been as smooth, nor our inclusivity as complete, as we like to
believe.
During the nineteenth century, American women steadily gained political and economic rights. But when women were
granted suffrage or married women the right to own property separate from their husbands, those gains were often motivated not by
a belief in women’s equality, but out of male self-interest. Granting
women rights became a means to strengthen a particular group’s
political influence, or to protect familial property. And only native-born white women benefitted from many of these privileges.
Following the Civil War, Radical Republicans sought to reconstruct the social fabric of the South, including granting citizenship and suffrage to African Americans. But those gains were
short-lived, as white southerners adopted Jim Crow laws, literacy
tests, and other means to limit African-American rights. The 1965
Voting Rights Act finally outlawed these discriminatory practices, but in recent years laws supposedly targeting voter fraud have
suppressed voter participation among people of color and both the
rural and urban poor.
Third U.S. President (and elite slaveholder) Thomas Jefferson envisioned a nation of yeoman farmers that would serve as the
basis of American democracy. A century later, historian Frederick
Jackson Turner similarly declared that the western frontier’s wide
open spaces and supposedly free land formed the basis of American democracy. Many nineteenth-century Americans agreed, and
this vision shaped many aspects of federal policy for generations.
For example, Jeffersonian agrarianism motivated both the Lou-
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isiana Purchase and the Homestead Act. But like our history of
expanding civil rights, the legacy of Jefferson’s vision is complex.
Only people of some means could afford to migrate west to claim
land. More than half of claimants failed to prove up on their land.
Western lands often wound up in the hands of speculators rather
than family farmers. Moreover, white settlement in the West was
predicated on the forced removal of native peoples. Indigenous
peoples’ lives were disrupted or destroyed to enable certain whites
to become good democratic citizens.
But even as the U.S. government fought wars and displaced
Native Americans to ensure a nation of independent men, many
Americans distrusted those western democrats. Painter George
Caleb Bingham captured this tension in his famous 1852 painting
The County Election. Although a blue banner declares “The will of
the people is the supreme law,” the raucous scene highlights the
influence of party politics, money, alcohol use, and even violence
on voters – all of them white men, of course. Young boys play with
a knife in the dirt and a stray dog wanders through the crowd, but
women and people of color are excluded from participation.
Bingham’s painting celebrated the participation of white men
from different social classes in western elections. But participation
by both wealthy businessmen and workingmen does not mean that
nineteenth-century elections were egalitarian. Party-specific tickets were cast publicly. Viva voce voting persisted in some states.
While speaking their choices out loud rather than marking a paper ballot made it possible for illiterate men to participate, it also
made them particularly vulnerable to pressure from the political
and economic elites.
American agrarian ideals were redefined in the twentieth
century. Rather than dreaming of owning an independent family
farm, Americans increasingly dreamed of owning a ranch home
surrounded by a green lawn in the suburbs. Homeownership replaced homestead ownership at the core of the American dream.
Like nineteenth-century land claim laws, government policies enabled wealthier white Americans to buy homes in these suburbs at
the expense of others.
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For all our faith in Jeffersonian agrarianism as the basis of a
free, democratic society, Americans have remained suspicious of
the people who make up that republic. Perhaps this tension between trust and distrust explains our pendulum swings between
growing civil rights and disfranchisement, and our continued
reliance on the Electoral College. Ironically, western lands that
were supposed to breed democracy instead have become among
the most inequitably treated under the Electoral College system.
Due to uneven population distribution, ethnically diverse California and Texas voters are grossly underrepresented in the Electoral
College, while heavily white Wyoming and North Dakota voters
are overrepresented. And nearly all western states have become
among the most reliably “red” or “blue,” thus limiting their impact on the presidential election. In recent presidential elections,
the Electoral College system has ensured that a few “battleground
states” – and especially white suburban men and women – have
determined the outcome of the presidential election. In 2016, rural Americans in Midwestern “swing states” consistently voted for
Donald Trump, while urban populations supported Hillary Clinton. white suburbanites proved to be the swingiest of swing voters,
and they won the Electoral College for Trump, despite Clinton’s
two percent advantage in the popular vote. Our policies ensured
that white suburban homeowners living in an earlier trans-Appalachian West would select the next President of the United States.
Americans are not as equal nor as egalitarian as we like to
believe. The persistent tension between egalitarianism and distrust
of individuals (especially women and ethnic minorities) contributed to our uneven progress toward social equality, and may help to
explain the tenacity of the unequal Electoral College system.

8
Quantifying a Candidate’s Advantage in the
Electoral College
Timothy Prescott
The Electoral College currently functions as a compromise between big states (who would like to see votes weighted proportionally to their population, as in the House of Representatives) and
small states (who would like each state to count equally, as in the
Senate). Nationally, there are about 600,000 people for each elector. But in the most extreme example of this weighting, Wyoming,
there are just under 200,000, so that each Wyoming resident is
about three times as powerful on the national stage.
Despite this, the biggest reason for the disparity between the
popular vote and the Electoral College is the fact that every state,
except for Nebraska and Maine, awards all of its electors to the
winner of that state. This means that a candidate could hypothetically lose the popular vote 25% to 75%, but because they eked out
victories in over half of the states, they could still win the Electoral
College. In fact, by concentrating on less populous states (currently the 40 smallest), it is possible to push this down to winning with
less than 23% of the popular vote.
This leads us to consider how candidates have historically
done in the Electoral College as compared to the national popular vote (assuming all electors vote as pledged). As the national
popular vote increases, we’ll distribute the votes proportional to
that candidate’s eventual support in each state, with each state and
its electors tipping one by one to the candidate’s side when the
distributed votes eclipses the opponent’s eventual total. The state
that finally provides the candidate with a majority in the Electoral
College determines the election. We’ll call that state the clinching
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state, and the difference between the clinching state’s margin of
victory and the candidate’s actual margin of victory their electoral
advantage.
For example, in the 2016 election, Donald Trump won the
Electoral College by 74 votes, but lost the popular vote by 2.09%.
He could have lost Michigan and Pennsylvania and still won the
Electoral College by 2 votes; it was Wisconsin with its margin of
.76% that clinched the Electoral College. Therefore, Trump could
have done .76% worse, lost the popular vote by 2.85%, and it
would have been Wisconsin that clinched the election. We will say
that this means Donald Trump had a 2.85% electoral advantage.
In contrast, in 2004 Bush won the popular vote by 2.46%. If
he had done 2.11% worse in every state, he would have won the
popular vote by .35%, lost Iowa and New Mexico, and the winner
of Ohio would have clinched the Electoral College. We’ll say that
this means Bush had a .35% electoral disadvantage (or a -.35%
electoral advantage). (In our hypothetical examples, the winning
candidate had a 50% and 54% advantage.)
Over the last 26 elections (going back to Wilson’s defeat of
Hughes in 1916), there have been 9 elections where the difference
in the popular vote was less than 5%, so that we find it meaningful
to talk about a candidate’s electoral advantage. Ranking them by
the winner’s advantage, those elections are:
Year
2016
1968
2012
2000
1960
2004
1976
1916
1948

Winner
Trump
Nixon
Obama
Bush		
Kennedy
Bush		
Carter		
Wilson		
Truman

Electoral Advantage
2.85%
1.58%
1.51%
0.52%
0.35%
-0.35%
-0.38%
-2.74%
-4.04%
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We observe the following:
• Donald Trump had the best electoral advantage of any victor.
• Truman’s surprise victory in 1948 is all the more impressive given
that he overcame the worst electoral disadvantage.
• In these elections, the Republican candidate averaged a 1.10%
electoral advantage.
This last point is worth further investigation. It is likely a combination of Republicans tending to do better in rural states (which tend
to have more electors relative to their size) and Democratic candidates running up the score in more populous urban states (which
helps with the popular vote, but not with the Electoral College).

Section Three
The Future of the Electoral College

9
If the Electoral College Can Contradict the
Popular Vote Sometimes, Why Would It Be Wrong
for Them To Do It Every Single Time?*
Jack Russell Weinstein
In my role as a public philosopher, I received a question from one
of my blog readers asking about the independence of the Electoral
College.1 The person wrote:
Long before the election, my class was discussing
the Electoral College, and one student opined that it
should be kept because the popular vote doesn’t accord with the electoral vote only some of the time.
This got me thinking, “Would we find it acceptable if
the popular vote never matched the electoral vote?” It
would seem that whatever makes it acceptable to have
the popular vote not match the electoral vote in some
instances, would also make such an outcome acceptable in every instance. Or, conversely, whatever makes
it unacceptable to have the popular vote not match
the electoral vote in every instance, would also make
such an outcome unacceptable in each instance. But
perhaps I’m missing something, so I thought I’d see
what you have to say in regard to the argumentation.
To put the question another way: if it is okay for the Electoral College to contradict the popular vote once in a while, why isn’t it okay
*
A version of this essay appeared as Jack Russell Weinstein, “If the Electoral College can contradict the popular vote sometimes, why would
it be wrong for them to do it every single time?” PQED: Philosophical
Questions Every Day (blog), November 28, 2016, http://www.pqed.
org/2016/11/if-electoral-college-can-contradict.html
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for it to do so all the time? How can opposing the popular vote be
right only some of the time?
This is a good, philosophically interesting, and relevant question. To answer it, we first have to ask why we have an Electoral
College in the first place, although, surprisingly, there isn’t a consensus on this basic fact.
One theory is that the Electoral College was intended to give
an equalizing voice to a region of slaveholders with a smaller white
population. There is some evidence for this. James Madison himself seemed concerned that “the right of suffrage was much more
diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter
could have no influence in the election on the score of Negroes”
(Madison Debates, July 19, 1787).2 In other words, since there
were more Northern than Southern voters, without the Electoral
College, the South would not be able to protect its right to maintain slaves.
Some cite Madison’s argument as a case against the very legitimacy of the Electoral College itself, but such a critique isn’t
persuasive. It runs afoul of the Genetic Fallacy, the observation
that the truth or validity of a conclusion does not depend on its
history or origin. Why the Electoral College came into being is
irrelevant to its current purpose. GPS was invented for the military, yet many peace activists still use it. Adolf Hitler designed the
Volkswagen Beetle (although one scholar argues that Hitler stole
it from a Jewish engineer),3 yet people who drive them do not necessary subscribe to his fascist philosophy. Similarly, just because the
Electoral College may have been in support of slavery at one time
does not mean it is now.
In fact, the real remedy for the Southern states’ disproportionately small influence was the Three-Fifths Compromise found
in Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Also proposed at 1787 con-

PQED: Philosophical Questions Every Day (blog) http://www.pqed.org/
James Madison, “July 19, 1787,” in Notes of debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. See Documents section.
3
Paul Schilperoord, The Extraordinary Life of Josef Ganz: The Jewish Engineer Behind Hitler’s Volkswagen. (New York : RVP Publishers, 2012).
1
2
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stitutional convention, this clause declared that slaves should be
counted as three-fifths of a freeperson for voting and taxation.
The Compromise is frequently and understandably touted
as a philosophical synecdoche of American racism. But it’s purpose
was not to reduce the humanity of the slave to less than one as it
is usually described; it was to give a slave some electoral power in
the first place, and, by extension, the electoral power of the South.
Naturally, I do not mean to suggest that the compromise is
not racist. It is. Slaves did not actually vote, slaveholders simply
justified their additional electoral power on the backs of slaves using the Electoral College to consolidate their power. My point is
simply that people tend not to understand its origins, giving credence, yet again, to the Genetic Fallacy, and making slavery less
important to today’s debate about the Electoral College. Once
slavery was abolished in 1865 and the Three-Fifths Compromise
rendered obsolete, this aspect of the Electoral College remained
historically important but functionally irrelevant.
Another popular justification for the Electoral College also
stems from the Madison debate: that it is a kind of “affirmative
action” for rural voters. Given the different population densities of
urban and agricultural regions, the Electors are supposed to equalize the power of voters across the country. This is the same sort of
justification the framers used when apportioning two Senators per
state regardless of their size, while basing the number of Representatives in the House on population. Without it, many claim, urban
populations would determine all national elections.
This notion of the Electoral College emphasizes the lack of
direct democracy in the Federal system. It echoes the Three-Fifths
Compromise in that it holds that for votes to be equal, they need
not be identical. Equality necessitates proportional, not uniform,
representation.
But there is a problem with continuing to justify the Electoral College on these grounds. First, it assumes that rural voters
have inherently different interests than urban voters, a generalization that simply doesn’t hold. Political positions must be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis, there is no reason to think that living in
the country or the city would affect one’s position on internation-
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al relations, abortion, interstate commerce, net neutrality, or the
vast majority of issues that concern government policies. It may
affect one’s position on agricultural issues, but even there, farmers
disagree on ethanol, genetically modified seeding, and the importance of monoculture farming, to name just a few controversies.
People also tend to assume that rural voters are necessarily
more conservative than urban voters, but this is simply not the
case. For many decades, Appalachia was a Democratic stronghold.
It isn’t anymore; it changed. But that just proves my point. And
while much has been made of the “traditional” family farm, there
are few populations that are more embracing of technological
change and government subsidies, and more suspicious of school
choice than small farmers. (“Vouchers” and charter schools are untenable in rural areas where many towns share a single school.)
The rural and urban electorate can simply not be cleanly divided
into conservative and liberal, no matter how much lip service is
given to the so-called “real America.”
Regardless of all of these considerations, if increased representation of the rural is the reason for the Electoral College, then
it simply failed to do its job in 2016. It did not magnify the agricultural voice; it increased the influence of the suburbs instead. As
Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox summarize in Forbes magazine, it
wasn’t alleged rural racism that rocketed Trump to power, it was
the suburban five-point lead, a three-point increase from Romney
in 2012.4
To summarize: if slavery is the reason for the Electoral College, we can’t answer the reader’s question at all and if voter equity
is the reason, then all we have learned is that the Electoral College
has failed. We do not yet know whether there is a moral difference
between the college opposing the popular vote sometimes and it
differing all the time.

Joel Kotkin and Wendell Cox, “It Wasn’t Rural ‘Hicks’ Who Elected
Trump: The Suburbs Were -- And Will Remain -- The Real Battleground,” Forbes. November 22, 2016. Accessed on December 31, 2016.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2016/11/22/donald-trump-clinton-rural-suburbs/
4
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However, the answer to the reader’s question can be found,
I think, in what I have always understood as the true purpose of
the Electoral College: to be an educated body in the face of an
uneducated public. From Plato onward, one of the most trenchant
criticisms of democracy has been that public policy is simply too
complex for the average person to understand. One needs both
special training in political reasoning, the argument asserts, as well
as to be able to emancipate oneself from private interest to qualify
as enlightened voter.
This is the tradition that Hamilton calls upon in Federalist
No. 68 when he wrote: “electors should be men most capable of
analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation…[they would be] most likely
to have the information and discernment” required to choose the
president.5 Ultimately, he argued, the presidency should be determined by the most qualified voter, not by people who vote simply
because they are eligible.
What might have Hamilton meant by these comments and
how does this change the role of the Electoral College? There are,
it seems to me, two possible interpretations—and two possible answers to our main question—depending on whether this layer of
qualified electors are to be regarded as insurance or as a representative body.
Let’s begin with the first interpretation, that is, that the job
of the Electoral College is to be a last-ditch effort to protect the
country from a demagogue who fools the public into voting for
him or her. If this is the case, then the Electoral College should
be regarded as an insurance policy and, as with all insurance, we
hope never to have to use it. We buy insurance hoping to waste
our money.
Under this interpretation, if the Electoral College contradicts the popular vote with good reason, we should celebrate their
choice. However, if it does so under conditions different than its
prescribed safeguard, if, for example, the candidate is not dangerous or a demagogue, but simply won because of the vicissitudes of
5
James Madison, Federalist No.68, in The Federalist Papers. See Documents section.
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electoral politics, then such a decision is to be deplored and the
presidency is illegitimate. This illegitimacy is, however, something
we have to put up with to preserve the protection we might someday need. In such a case, a president who did not win the popular
vote is the “price we pay” for the Electoral College.
In other words, if we consider the Electoral College as an
insurance policy against demagoguery, the justification for the
Electoral College is utilitarian. We are willing to accept some bad
stuff for the greater good. An occasional disagreement between it
and the popular vote can be justified, but continual disagreement
cannot.
My personal feeling, by the way, is that this is the true purpose of the Electoral College. Since it did not protect us from
Trump, it will never protect us from anyone and can no longer be
justified. Even more so, since one of Hamilton’s specific concerns
was that the vote might be corrupted by “foreign powers to gain
an improper ascendant in our councils,” it failed in its very specific mandate.6 As a preponderance of evidence has shown, Russia
significantly influenced the election, orchestrating a Clinton loss
despite her popular-vote landslide. The Electors knew this but
disregarded it, emphasizing that the Electoral College no longer
plays its intended part as insurer. It has become, instead, a tool for
partisan sidestepping of the popular vote.
The second possible interpretation of Hamilton’s preference
for educated electors over the general population leads to a deontological justification for the Electoral College—it builds on a
principle that allows for no exception. It puts forth the idea of representative government in its strongest from, regarding electors
themselves as agents akin to all of our officials, not simply protectors with narrow mandates whom we call upon in very specific
situations.
If we regard Electors as representatives—if we see them like
Congress members or as specialists who have more refined political senses than the layperson—then we have to think of the popular
vote as only advisory rather than binding. In other words, when the
general populace votes and expresses its will, the Electors ought
6

Madison, Federalist No.68. See Documents section.
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to consider it as only one of many factors, and then vote based
on their personal (allegedly professional and educated) judgment.
This may or may not assume their personal judgment is better, but
it does regard their representative role as having more authority to
choose the president than an average voter.
There are, incidentally, good and convincing fictional portrayals of this point of view. In an episode of The West Wing titled
“The Lame Duck Congress,” when faced with deciding whether to
approve a nuclear treaty against the wishes of 82% of the voters,
the fictional President Bartlett says:
Can I tell you something, honestly? This is one of those
situations where I couldn’t give a damn what the people think. The complexities of a global arms treaty, the
technological, the military, the diplomatic nuances, it’s
staggering, Toby. 82% of the people cannot possibly be
expected to reach an informed decision.
Bartlett’s point is taken significantly farther by President Andrew
Shepherd, in the movie The American President:
Lewis Rothschild: …People want leadership, Mr. President, and in the absence of genuine leadership, they’ll
listen to anyone who steps up to the microphone. They
want leadership. They’re so thirsty for it they’ll crawl
through the desert toward a mirage, and when they discover there’s no water, they’ll drink the sand.
President Andrew Shepherd: Lewis, we’ve had presidents who were beloved, who couldn’t find a coherent
sentence with two hands and a flashlight. People don’t
drink the sand because they’re thirsty. They drink the
sand because they don’t know the difference.
If this point of view is correct and if the American population is
simply not educated enough to make good democratic decisions,
then the popular vote is simply advisory to the Electoral College
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rather than binding. And, if this is the case, the College’s decision
is, by definition, always right. It and only it, has the job of choosing
our president. In such an interpretation of Hamilton’s words, there
is no such thing as an electoral vote that contradicts the popular
vote, just one that considered it and moved on.
One final observation: differing attitudes about voter
knowledge is a point of contention in the debate between John
Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the patron saints of American
and French democracy, respectively. The role of individual perspective marks a dividing line between the American notion that
people’s beliefs about their own interest is more important than
their generalized knowledge, and the French democratic model,
which assumes that personal interest is secondary to collective
understanding, or the Republic’s interests. Hamilton’s view of the
Electoral College as permanent representative seems to fit more
with the French model than the American one, suggesting, yet
again, that the Electoral College is inconsistent with American
democratic values. It seems to me that the given all we have discussed, the only viable justification for the Electoral College is one
based on its role as insurance against demagoguery and, as we have
seen, it has failed in its role. Certainly, this conclusion is based in
part on my own political leanings, but that doesn’t make it wrong.
Perspective and bias are not the same thing.
Nevertheless, to sum up my rather lengthy answer to the
reader’s question: if the Electoral College is insurance, then we
have to put up with a couple unjustified conflicts in order to protect ourselves against potential serious dangers. In such a case, the
Electoral College must agree with the popular vote in most but
not all instances, and when it doesn’t, we have to regard it as a
necessary evil.
But if the Electoral College plays a representative role and
the general popular vote is advisory, then it is theoretically possible for the Electoral College to disagree with the majority every
single time and still be legitimate. In this case, the popular vote
will always be secondary to the judgment of its representatives.
Or, as President Bartlett puts it immediately after his comment
above: “…we forget sometimes, in all the talk about democracy, we
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forget it’s not a democracy, it’s a republic. People don’t make the
decisions, they choose the people who make the decisions. Could
they do a better job choosing? Yeah. But when you consider the
alternatives,…”
As is hopefully evident, the reader’s question goes to the
heart of the American experiment. Are we a democracy or a republic, and if we are one or the other, is it what we were supposed to be
or just what we ended up as? The Genetic Fallacy makes original
intent a less powerful argument for any constitutional interpretation, but it doesn’t make it less interesting. Whatever damages the
Electoral College may or may not have inflicted this time around,
the fact that it has given us an opportunity to reflect on the nature
of democracy is itself a gift worth celebrating.

10
Electoral College is Fixable; Senate is Not.
Mark Trahant
The Electoral College was a huge mistake. It’s anti-democratic. It’s
18th century machinery designed to elect a government despite
deep philosophical differences between states, regions and cities.
And, in a digital economy, the mechanics makes no sense.
But the funny thing is: The Electoral College is fixable.
If votes were counted proportionally, instead of winner-takecall, the results would be a lot closer to the popular will and still
account for regional differences in thinking. (This reform would
not require a Constitutional amendment, but all 50 states would
have to agree.)
Indeed the Electoral College gets the attention for being undemocratic when there are other issues in the American version of
democracy that cry out for real reform.
Consider the notion of requiring a super-majority in the Senate (a filibuster-proof 60 votes). The Senate elects two members
from each state. So California’s 36 million citizens get two votes –
exactly the same as Wyoming’s 532,000 people. And the super-majority makes matters worse because senators representing a tiny
slice of the population can block legislation that most Americans
favor.
The Senate has a unique history and in that favorite argument used by so many, “we have always done it that way.” But let’s
be clear about this, the structure of the Senate does not represent democratic values. Why does this matter? Especially when it’s
worked for more than two centuries?
The Senate ceased its claim to democracy in 1920 when the
census showed that the United States had become an urban nation.

48

A century ago this did not matter because the values and priorities
were largely the same; the opposite is true now. The greatest divide
in our politics stems from this rural, urban split on issues ranging
from natural resource extraction to climate change. Yet the Senate
skews rural dramatically. It only takes 17 percent of the country
to elect a majority in the Senate (and that’s not even including the
additional ten votes required for a supermajority.)
The House is not particularly democratic either. The United
States is one of the few countries in the world that clings to a district system that can be manipulated by a political party. Districts
are designed to favor incumbents or the party in power. In other
countries, proportional representation insures that all constituent
groups are represented in body politic. In a district system, however, the other party is often shut out from all elective offices in a
state.
Could there be reform without a new Constitution? Perhaps.
States could create multiple congressional districts. And California could split into two, three or even four states, to even out the
Senate a bit. We need more representation, not less. So I’d like to
see a Senate the size of the House now and a people House of Representatives that was significantly larger in order to accommodate
more points of view.
Democratic reform is critical when the U.S. preaches it as
a value to the rest of the world. That means system reform, well
beyond a quick fix to the Electoral College. And, who knows? After
reform a proportional Electoral College could actually work. Even
in a digital century.

11
Long Habits and Legitimacy
Mark Stephen Jendrysik
“A long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial
appearance of being right, and raises at first a formidable outcry
in defense of custom.” When Thomas Paine said this in Common
Sense (1776) he was speaking about monarchy, but he could have
been saying it about the Electoral College (EC).1 The EC might
once have had a purpose, and it can be argued that the EC was
necessary at the beginning of the republic to overcome the basic problems of time and space that made rapid communication
of electoral results across a continent-spanning nation difficult if
not impossible.2 This constitutional feature was designed for a very
different time.
Like other features of the United States Constitution such as
state equality in the Senate, the EC is now an ossified remnant of
a distant past that creates a crisis of political legitimacy every time
the EC fails to ratify the popular vote. While this has only happened four times in the history of the country (1876, 1888, 2000
and 2016), current demographic and political division make it possible this outcome might become a regular event. If elections are
repeatedly resolved in the EC to the detriment of popular majorities, possibly numbering in the millions, America will face a crisis
of legitimacy. After all, why should the election of the president be
T. Paine, Common Sense. Philadelphia: Printed. And sold by W . and T.
Bradford [1776]). Accessed on December 31, 2016. http://xroads.virginia.edu/~hyper/Paine/common.html
2
It generally took at least two weeks to travel from New York to
Charleston, South Carolina in 1800.
1
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the only election where the majority (or plurality) does not determine the winner?3
Every argument in favor of the EC is made mindlessly, or in
bad faith, or to cover up less than savory ideas. To co-opt George
Orwell, the EC “can indeed be defended, but only by arguments
which are too brutal for most people to face.”4 Mindless defenses
of the EC pop up every four years. Repeatedly saying “We are a
republic not a democracy” is not an argument, it is an incantation.
Claiming the EC is a feature of state sovereignty ignores that fact
that the states are not actually sovereign. Saying “that’s how the
Founders set it up, and they were greater men than we are” infantilizes those of us alive today. Such thinking makes us children,
forced to forever obey the Framers, without volition or reason of
our own. To paraphrase Paine, the Founders might as well have
declared themselves immortal, since we now have no choice but to
follow their will.5
Bad faith arguments in support of the EC are easy to find.
Donald Trump’s complaints about the EC turned to praise once
he discovered it was working in his favor. We can also note people
who say we can just amend the Constitution to get rid of the EC,
while knowing full well that will never happen. Or we can consider
the arguments of people in small states whose votes count for more
than the voters of more populous states. Defending a weighted
vote system requires a set of rather dubious and ultimately disturbing assumptions.6 For example, saying that the EC protects the interests of rural areas against urban ones, suggests that some voters
votes should have a greater weight. After all, “Real Americans ™”
In a similar sense, state equality in the Senate poses serious questions
of legitimacy as well. Currently somewhat less the 15% of the population controls over half the seats in the Senate, a trend which will only
grow more extreme.
4
G. Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” Horizon Vol. 13, No.
76. (April 1946), 261.
5
See T. Paine, Rights of Man (London: Joseph Johnson, 1791) for a
discussion of the absurdity of the idea that the dead can constrain the
living.
6
Or, maybe you believe that empty space should be allowed to vote.
3

51

are the honest sons of the soil, not untrustworthy city slickers. As
Michael Barone notoriously claimed, the EC protects the country
from the rule of the voters of California, who, as we all know, don’t
represent or support real American values.7 And so it is only just
that their votes count for less in the EC.
The United States Constitution is an admirable document.
But parts of it can be compared to a petrified forest, once alive and
vibrant, now merely existing. Even worse, parts of it, in particular the EC, are like vestigial organs. Like the appendix, the EC is
mostly harmless and unnoticed. But every once in a while, the EC
reminds us of its existence and threatens the health and safety of
the Republic. In a democracy elections decided by less than a majority are, on their face, illegitimate.8 Quite simply, choosing the
single most important office in the world through anti-democratic
methods leaves a ticking time bomb of disaster at the heart of our
political system.

7
Michael Barone, “Ditching the Electoral College” Washington Examiner, December 4, 2016. Accessed December 31, 2016. http://www.
washingtonexaminer.com/ditching-electoral-college-would-allow-california-to-impose-imperial-rule-on-a-colonial-america/article/2608766
The key paragraph: “California’s 21st century veer to the left makes it a
live issue again. In a popular vote system, the voters of this geographically distant and culturally distinct state, whose contempt for heartland
Christians resembles imperial London’s disdain for the ‘lesser breeds’ it
governed, could impose something like colonial rule over the rest of the
nation. Sounds exactly like what the Framers strove to prevent.”
8
There are over 500,000 elected officials in the United States. All of
them, except the president are chosen by majority or plurality elections. David Nir, “Just how many elected officials are there in the
United States? The answer is mind-blowing,” Daily Kos. March 29,
2015. Accessed on December 31, 2016. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/3/29/1372225/-Just-how-many-elected-officials-are-there-inthe-United-States-The-answer-is-mind-blowing
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In Defense of the Electoral College*
Allen Guelzo and James H. Hulme
There is hardly anything in the Constitution harder to explain, or
easier to misunderstand, than the Electoral College. And when a
presidential election hands the palm to a candidate who comes in
second in the popular vote but first in the Electoral College tally,
something deep in our democratic viscera balks and asks why the
Electoral College shouldn’t be dumped as a useless relic of 18th
century white, gentry privilege.
Actually, there have been only five occasions when a closely
divided popular vote and the electoral vote have failed to point
in the same direction. No matter. After last week’s results, we’re
hearing a litany of complaints: the Electoral College is undemocratic, the Electoral College is unnecessary, the Electoral College
was invented to protect slavery — and the demand to push it down
the memory hole.
All of which is strange because the Electoral College is at
the core of our system of federalism. The Founders who sat in
the 1787 Constitutional Convention lavished an extraordinary
amount of argument on the Electoral College, and it was by no
means one-sided. The great Pennsylvania jurist James Wilson
believed that “if we are to establish a national Government,” the
president should be chosen by a direct, national vote of the people.
But wise old Roger Sherman of Connecticut replied that the president ought to be elected by Congress, since he feared that direct
election of presidents by the people would lead to the creation of a
A version of this essay appeared as Allen Guelzo and James Hulme, “In
defense of the Electoral College,” PostEverything (blog), The Washington
Post, November 15, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/15/in-defense-of-the-electoral-college/
*
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monarchy. “An independence of the Executive [from] the supreme
Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there
was any such thing.” Sherman was not trying to undermine the
popular will, but to keep it from being distorted by a president who
mistook popular election as a mandate for dictatorship.
Quarrels like this flared all through the convention, until, at
almost the last minute, James Madison “took out a Pen and Paper,
and sketched out a mode of Electing the President” by a “college”
of “Electors … chosen by those of the people in each State, who
shall have the Qualifications requisite.”
The Founders also designed the operation of the Electoral College with unusual care. The portion of Article 2, Section 1,
describing the Electoral College is longer and descends to more
detail than any other single issue the Constitution addresses. More
than the federal judiciary — more than the war powers — more
than taxation and representation. It prescribes in precise detail
how “Each State shall appoint … a Number of Electors, equal to
the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress”; how these electors “shall
vote by Ballot” for a president and vice president; how they “shall
sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government
of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate” the
results of their balloting; how a tie vote must be resolved; what
schedule the balloting should follow; and on and on.
Above all, the Electoral College had nothing to do with slavery. Some historians have branded the Electoral College this way
because each state’s electoral votes are based on that “whole Number of Senators and Representatives” from each State, and in 1787
the number of those representatives was calculated on the basis of
the infamous three-fifths clause. But the Electoral College merely
reflected the numbers, not any bias about slavery (and in any case,
the three-fifths clause was not quite as proslavery a compromise as
it seems, since Southern slaveholders wanted their slaves counted as five-fifths for determining representation in Congress, and
had to settle for a whittled-down fraction). As much as the abolitionists before the Civil War liked to talk about the “proslavery
Constitution,” this was more of a rhetorical posture than a serious
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historical argument. And the simple fact remains, from the record
of the Constitutional Convention’s proceedings (James Madison’s
famous Notes), that the discussions of the Electoral College and
the method of electing a president never occur in the context of
any of the convention’s two climactic debates over slavery.
If anything, it was the Electoral College that made it possible
to end slavery, since Abraham Lincoln earned only 39 percent of
the popular vote in the election of 1860, but won a crushing victory
in the Electoral College. This, in large measure, was why Southern
slaveholders stampeded to secession in 1860-61. They could do the
numbers as well as anyone, and realized that the Electoral College
would only produce more anti-slavery Northern presidents.
Yet, even on those terms, it is hard for Americans to escape
the uncomfortable sense that, by inserting an extra layer of “electors” between the people and the president, the Electoral College
is something less than democratic. But even if we are a democratic
nation, that is not all we are. The Constitution also makes us a
federal union, and the Electoral College is pre-eminently both the
symbol and a practical implementation of that federalism.
The states of the union existed before the Constitution, and
in a practical sense, existed long before the revolution. Nothing
guaranteed that, in 1776, the states would all act together, and
nothing that guaranteed that after the Revolution they might not
go their separate and quarrelsome ways, much like the German
states of the 18th century or the South American republics in the
19th century. The genius of the Constitutional Convention was its
ability to entice the American states into a “more perfect union.”
But it was still a union of states, and we probably wouldn’t have
had a constitution or a country at all unless the route we took was
federalism.
The Electoral College was an integral part of that federal
plan. It made a place for the states as well as the people in electing
the president by giving them a say at different points in a federal
process and preventing big-city populations from dominating the
election of a president.
Abolishing the Electoral College now might satisfy an irritated yearning for direct democracy, but it would also mean dis-
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mantling federalism. After that, there would be no sense in having
a Senate (which, after all, represents the interests of the states),
and further along, no sense even in having states, except as administrative departments of the central government. Those who
wish to abolish the Electoral College ought to go the distance,
and do away with the entire federal system and perhaps even retire
the Constitution, since the federalism it was designed to embody
would have disappeared.
None of that, ironically, is liable to produce a more democratic election system. There are plenty of democracies, like Great
Britain, where no one ever votes directly for a head of the government. But more important, the Electoral College actually keeps
presidential elections from going undemocratically awry because it
makes unlikely the possibility that third-party candidates will garner enough votes to make it onto the electoral scoreboard.
Without the Electoral College, there would be no effective
brake on the number of “viable” presidential candidates. Abolish
it, and it would not be difficult to imagine a scenario where, in
a field of a dozen micro-candidates, the “winner” only needs 10
percent of the vote, and represents less than 5 percent of the electorate. And presidents elected with smaller and smaller pluralities
will only aggravate the sense that an elected president is governing
without a real electoral mandate.
The Electoral College has been a major, even if poorly comprehended, mechanism for stability in a democracy, something
which democracies are sometimes too flighty to appreciate. It may
appear inefficient. But the Founders were not interested in efficiency; they were interested in securing “the blessings of liberty.”
The Electoral College is, in the end, not a bad device for securing
that.

13
Electoral College Alternatives: Tradeoffs
Benjamin J. Kassow
Forty-eight states use a popular vote method to allocate electoral
votes (two states, Nebraska and Maine, use a partially congressional-district based allocation for the electoral votes in those states).
One of the key controversies regarding the Electoral College has
been the degree to which the Electoral College is perceived by
some to be “anti-democratic” in that people argue that the Electoral College does not reflect the “will of the people.” To me, as
is often the case, the key thought is thinking about the Electoral
College as it currently exists and other possible electoral systems
for the presidency in terms of a series of tradeoffs.
What might these tradeoffs look like? First, do we want
a system that directly reflects the will of the largest plurality of
Americans, the majority (50+%) of voting Americans, or one that
reflects some level of dispersion and geographic viability throughout a variety of regions in the country? Secondly, depending on
what we prioritize as a country, what system might we want that
would reflect these priorities? Thirdly, do most Americans want
the Electoral College to change? Finally, if many Americans want
to reform the Electoral College, what tradeoffs would we want to
make to ensure that people feel that their vote counts?
One first question is how the Electoral College could be
changed, from a logistical perspective. On first glance, eliminating
(or strongly modifying) the Electoral College looks daunting. At
a most basic level, the Constitution must be amended, which of
course, is exceedingly difficult. While other approaches are possible to use (changing electoral laws in the states, for instance, which
decide how to allocate Electoral College votes), questions remain
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as to what might be the most feasible method to do so. Still, many
attempts to change the Electoral College certainly exist in American history, although only one has really been fundamental in
terms of changing the Electoral College allocation proposal in a
serious way: the Bayh-Celler (H.R. J. Res. 681) Amendment (1969)
proposal. The intractability of eliminating or massively changing
the Electoral College is reflected in the relatively few major attempts at the federal level since the Civil War. Additionally, there
are still substantial questions as to what tradeoffs we might want
to have as a country, assuming a different approach from what we
have now.
The second approach: changing state legislation as to how
states distribute their Electoral College votes. While this is more
practical, it also raises other potential issues of inequity among
states, and how much your vote may count for president being in
one state versus another. Unless somehow all states could change
concurrently, simply changing a state or two would likely result
in other problems, including substantial differences in how states
award electors. This could lead to the potential for large inequities
among states as to how people’s votes actually count in presidential elections. From a Constitutional standpoint, specifically with
regards to the Equal Protection Clause, this may prove problematic (see Bush v Gore, 531 U.S. 98, [2000]), and may lead to other
concerns about how individual’s votes are counted (i.e., if it varies
dramatically among states).
Even if a majority of United States citizens approves reforming the Electoral College, another question of practicality also
rears its head. If we open the Electoral College “Pandora’s box,”
then what problems might we have with any other potential solution? Certainly, if we were to have a national popular vote, there
would be strong criticisms by many that the will of states would
be taken away. Similarly, if we were to adopt a different system,
would that help to solve the problems that those who criticize the
Electoral College level at the College? While it might, depending
on the solution chosen, a host of other questions would also arise.
So, what could potentially be an alternative to the Electoral
College, as it currently stands? President Nixon himself, in 1969,
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proposed replacing the Electoral College with a national popular-vote based system that would simply award the presidential
candidate with the highest percentage of the popular vote the
presidency. One tool in this proposal would have prevented a candidate with a very small percentage of the popular vote from leading, which would be a mandatory runoff election between the top
two candidates if no candidate exceeded 40% of the popular vote.
But what tradeoff would a system like this have? The fate of the
Bayh-Celler amendment, although it is only one case, is perhaps
quite instructive as to the various tradeoffs involved with altering
how the Electoral College functions, at the federal level. While
the amendment passed with bipartisan support through the House
of Representatives, it was successfully filibustered in the Senate,
because it would damage the ability of smaller states to influence
the outcome of United States presidential elections in the future.
So, as I have already mentioned, the constant tradeoff is in terms
of how to distribute voting power to choose the president: should
it be distributed to individuals as one person in the entire United
States, or distributed to individuals as part of an individual state
within the United States?
In closing, thinking about the Electoral College, regardless
of whether we may be in favor of it, opposed to it, or decidedly
neutral, requires us to consider a series of tradeoffs. Do we want
a political system that encourages political candidates to have majorities of geographic regions within the United States, or one that
encourage presidential candidates to win the most votes more generally? Which system better reflects the will of the people? In any
case, when thinking about whether we approve of the Electoral
College as is or whether/how we may wish to alter it, it is crucial to
examine any tradeoffs we might be making if we were to change it.

Section Four
Teaching the Electoral College

14
“Empathy for the Unicorn”:
Teaching About the Electoral College
Brad Austin
I approach the topic of “teaching the electoral college” from two
different, if related, perspectives.1 The first is that of an historian
trained in modern American history, someone who teaches about
the disputed elections of 1876 and 2000 and who notes how a few
thousand votes in specific states would have denied John F. Kennedy the presidency in 1960 and given the nation President Nixon
ahead of schedule. Like most teachers, I address the basic “rules of
the game” of the Electoral College and explain how a candidate
can attract more popular support than his (and now, her) opposition but still lose the election. Other essays in this volume offer
teachers and other interested citizens the historical contexts they
need to teach the mechanics and specific consequences of the Electoral College and those elections.
My second perspective is that of someone who trains future
high and middle school history teachers and who spends most of
my “methods of teaching history” course encouraging my students
to make their own classes about more than the mere memorization
of names, dates, treaties, and battles. As someone who emphasizes
the importance of teaching historical thinking skills (close reading
of sources, chronological thinking, determining causation, identiOddly enough, I discussed the relationship between North Dakota and
the Electoral College with my Massachusetts university students during
a wide-ranging conversation on the day after the election. If I recall
correctly, my remark was something along the lines of “One of the consequences of the electoral college is that individual North Dakota voters
have a lot more power than we do in presidential elections.”
1
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fying perspectives, etc.), I embrace the opportunities that studying the Electoral College provides to teachers who want to challenge their students’ assumptions and to give them materials and
questions that push them to formulate arguments and to think for
themselves.
Sam Wineburg, in his path-breaking Historical Thinking and
Other Unnatural Acts, recounts the story of Marco Polo and the
world’s ugliest unicorns.2 As Wineburg explains, during his travels,
Polo came across an animal with a head “like a wild Boar” and a
short, stubby horn. Obviously, it was a unicorn. Polo concluded
that this animal was “a passing ugly beast to look upon, and is not
in the least like that which our stories tell of as being caught in
the lap of a virgin; in fact, ‘tis altogether different from what we
fancied.”3 Modern readers, of course, recognize that Polo was describing a rhinoceros, not a unicorn, even if they might concede
that virgins (and non-virgins alike) might be wise to avoid having
one sit on their laps.
I include this story not because I find it intrinsically interesting (although I do), but because I second Wineburg’s call for
history instructors to use their lessons and their classes to enhance
their students’ capacities for empathy, for understanding how others perceive and experience the world. This story demonstrates
how even very worldly, learned people are often inclined to consider new information and evidence within the confines of existing
belief systems and paradigms for understanding the world. Put differently, we are too often blinded by what we “know” to recognize
what we see.
After the 2016 presidential election results proved pundits
to be spectacularly wrong, many commentators pointed to Americans’ increasing inclination to avoid exposure to conflicting ideas
and evidence as a reason for the surprise many felt when the outSam Wineburg, Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts: Charting
the Future of Teaching the Past (Temple University Press, 2011), 24.
3
Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo: The Complete Yule-Cordier
Edition Dover Publications, 1993), 285.
2
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come became clear. The causes of our current inability to agree
on basic facts or the authority of experts will probably spawn a
thousands dissertations and keep political scientists and sociologists employed for a generation, but it is not the focus of this essay.
Our current situation, in fact, reminds us of the obligation history
teachers have to prepare students for the demands of civic life, and
teaching the Electoral College offers multiple opportunities for us
to fulfill that obligation.
Teaching about the history of the Electoral College, and the
ideologies and assumptions that led to its creation, allows instructors to challenge their students to see something new (a rhino)
instead of seeing just another unicorn, if an ugly one. If our students are going to develop the ability to understand and appreciate
different perspectives and viewpoints, then studying history is a
great place to practice that skill. Specifically, it is vital that our students realize that “they” (the founding generation) did not think
like “us.” Heck, “they” didn’t even think like each other, a fact that
explains the emergence of Federalist and Anti-Federalist camps
before the ratification of the Constitution and the almost immediate evolution of political factions into parties after the new government was formed. These divisions and disagreements present
us with an abundance of opportunities for our students to explore
how particular experiences (the Revolution, opposition to George
III, Articles of Confederation, etc.), regional perspectives (coastal,
in-land, North, South, small state, large state, etc.), economic situation (merchant, farmer, plantation owner, tradesman, enslaved
person, etc.) led to different conclusions about the desirability of
the new government and, especially, its purposefully convoluted
and anti-democratic way of choosing a chief executive. In short, a
close look at the intellectual roots of the Electoral College challenges students to understand how and why our “Founding Fathers” held vastly different opinions about the desirability of this
system for selecting a president and to consider the roots of those
disagreements.
Teachers looking for specific ways to do this need only to
consult the Documents section of this volume to find abundant
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primary sources that can help them accomplish their pedagogical goals. For example, if teachers want to illustrate the wide variety of options considered by the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, then they can ask their students to read (and perhaps
translate to 21st-century language) James Madison’s notes on “Debates Concerning the Method of Selecting the Executive,” especially those from June 1st and September 4th. The notes on June 1st
illustrate some of the options initially considered (direct election,
Congressional choice, Senate choice, etc.), and the September 4th
notes document the ways that several leaders argued over the proposed Electoral College plan, with Governeur Morris offering a
succinct six-part defense of the plan in response to some pointed
criticism. While teachers would be well served to familiarize themselves with the rest of the debate, these two sections alone give
students enough to see how personal experiences, others’ histories,
and political philosophies led delegates to very different conclusions about the Electoral College.
Students will also be interested to see that the text of the
Constitution reflects the delegates’ desires to cede considerable
power to the states and their legislature. As one can see in Documents section, Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution reads, in
part, “Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature
may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an elector.” Teachers can ask students to create an imaginative and comprehensive list of different ways those states could
have chosen their electors, given only these instructions, and to
consider the says these options would have empowered different
groups.
Given the popularity of the Broadway musical based on his
life, Alexander Hamilton’s involvement in the debate might attract the attention of students. While he participated in the convention debates, Hamilton’s most important contributions to our
understanding of the purpose of the Electoral College are found
in his essay, Federalist No. 68, available in the Documents section.
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Here, Hamilton notes that the Electoral College might be the one
part of the Constitution that had not yet sparked great discussion,
something he credited to the fact “that if the manner of [selecting
the president] be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an
eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be
wished for.” The next several paragraphs outlines those advantages
for readers, and they do so in language that is accessible to students
who want to see the best case Hamilton could make for the Electoral College. Teachers might want to know if their 21st century
students agree with Hamilton about the value of these elements of
the Electoral College.
If they have their students read Hamilton’s thoughts, then
teachers might also want to introduce their students to Antifederalist No. 72, in which Republicus questions the wisdom of using an Electoral College to choose an executive. In this essay (also
available in the Documents section), the author offers an extended
critique of this method:
“I go now to Art. 2, Sec. 1, which vest the supreme continental executive power in a president -- in order to the
choice of whom, the legislative body of each state is empowered to point out to their constituents some mode
of choice, or (to save trouble) may choose themselves, a
certain number of electors, who shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot, for two persons, one
of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same
state with themselves. Or in other words, they shall vote
for two, one or both of whom they know nothing of…
Is it then become necessary, that a free people should
first resign their right of suffrage into other hands besides their own, and then, secondly, that they to whom
they resign it should be compelled to choose men, whose
persons, characters, manners, or principles they know
nothing of? And, after all (excepting some such change
as is not likely to happen twice in the same century)
to intrust Congress with the final decision at last? Is it
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necessary, is it rational, that the sacred rights of mankind should thus dwindle down to Electors of electors,
and those again electors of other electors? This seems
to be degrading them even below the prophetical curse
denounced by the good old patriarch, on the offspring
of his degenerate son: ‘servant of servants’.”
Given that there was clearly a public debate over the Constitution and its many provisions, teachers can seize the opportunity
to put their students in the shoes of the partisans. In this case, in
order to have their students understand some of the most important arguments for and against the Electoral College, teachers could
have students use Madison’s notes, Hamilton’s Federalist No. 68,
and the Anti-Federalist essay as their main sources for a classroom
debate, with students being free to offer their own suggestions for
choosing a president as well. This exercise would allow, but not
require, students to research the biographies of the central figures
and, among the more creative and theatrical students, it could lead
to Hamilton-style “cabinet meeting” rap battles that draw on specific primary sources and present historically accurate arguments.
I’d like to conclude with a final note about how we can profitably talk about assumptions and the Electoral College in the
classroom. It is worth noting (or leading our students to the realization), that however much they disagreed about the mechanics
and desirability of the Electoral College, the participants in this
debate shared some common assumptions about who should have
the right to vote and to participate in the political process. As other
essays in this volume point out, one of the purposes of the Electoral College was to protect the rights of slaveholders by giving them
disproportionate political power, thanks in part to the Three-Fifths
clause elsewhere in the Constitution. Students should note that
almost no one in the late eighteenth century publically advocated
for women’s political rights and that Massachusetts’s new constitution stripped voting rights from citizens who did not meet the
new, higher property-owning threshold for voting. Moreover, in
the early 1800s, New Jersey stripped women of the right to vote in
that state, and several other states passed new laws denying African
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Americans the right to the franchise that they have had previously
enjoyed. Essentially, “the people” in the new republic had a different connotation than it does today. When we ask our students to
think about why the Founders designed such a complicated, undemocratic system as the Electoral College, it is useful to broaden
the discussion to include all of the assumptions they made about
the trustworthiness of the American electorate and who should
properly have their views represented in the new government.

Documents

Documents
To prepare for the Constitutional Convention, James Madison
studied the governmental and legal histories of other societies, focusing in particular on why past confederacies had failed. Yet despite all this research, about a month before the convention began,
Madison confessed to George Washington that he had “scarcely
ventured” to fashion an opinion about the form and powers that
a “National executive” might have under a new constitution. As it
turned out, many of the longest-running disputes at the convention
concerned the executive branch, and, as Madison later remarked,
the “difficulty of finding an unexceptionable” method for electing the president was “deeply felt” by the delegates. Document 1
(The Constitutional Convention) illuminates the philosophical
and political issues that shaped the delegates’ debates about the
executive branch, while Document 2 (Article II of the U.S. Constitution) showcases the method of election they ultimately chose.
Document 3 (Federalist Paper No. 68) is Alexander Hamilton’s famous defense of the so-called Electoral College, while Document
4 (Anti-Federalist Paper No. 68) and Document 5 (Anti-Federalist
Paper No. 72) represent the Anti-Federalist critique of the system.
The ratification of the Constitution was not the end of the story,
however. The partisan battles of the 1790s soon prompted an overhauling of the Electoral College, as illustrated by Document 6 (the
12th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) and Document 7 (Timothy Pickering’s 1803 speech in favor of the 12th Amendment).
Nevertheless, as shown by Document 8 (Madison’s 1823 letter to
George Hay), Madison continued to perceive defects in the electoral process, lamenting that many states had embraced winnertake-all systems for selecting presidential electors, and that each
state was accorded one vote when presidential elections devolved
to the House of Representatives. Finally, as evident in Document
9 (Madison’s 1830 letter to James Hillhouse), over forty years after
the Constitutional Convention, Madison remained “duly sensible
to the evils incident to the existing” system for picking the presi-
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dent, and welcomed efforts to improve it. However, even with the
system’s shortcomings, Madison was confident that “it will be a
rare case that the Presidential contest will not issue in a choice
that will not discredit the Station, and not be acquiesced in by the
unsuccessful party, foreseeing as it must do, the appeal to be again
made at no very distant day, to the will of the Nation.”
In addition to the documents provided in this volume, many
useful resources concerning the Electoral College can be found
on the web (hyperlinks are in bold). Wikipedia, for example, has
interesting charts showing how states picked presidential electors
during the early American republic and how each state’s allotment
of electoral votes has changed over time. As was the case during the
nation’s initial years, the 1960s witnessed extensive debates about
the Electoral College. One of the most striking episodes occurred
in 1966 when Delaware filed suit against New York, charging
that the latter’s winner-take-all system for awarding electoral votes
hurt the less populous states. Also noteworthy during this period
was President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1966 speech in favor of reform,
and comparable addresses in 1969 by Congressman Gerald Ford
and President Richard Nixon, all three of which can be found
here. More recently, the supporters of the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact have attempted to effectively replace the
Electoral College with a national popular vote, but their prospects
for success appear uncertain, since a 2016 Gallop poll showed
support for the Electoral College to be at a fifty-year high.

Document 1
The Constitutional Convention
Debates Concerning the Method of Selecting the Executive
(June 1 - September 6, 1787)
FRIDAY June 1, 1787
William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. “that a
national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature-for the term of ------ years &c to be ineligible thereafter,
to possess the executive powers of Congress &c.”
Mr. PINKNEY was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid
the Executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to
peace & war &c., which would render the Executive a monarchy,
of the worst kind, to wit an elective one.
Mr. WILSON moved that the Executive consist of a single
person.
Mr. C PINKNEY seconded the motion, so as to read “that a
National Ex. to consist of a single person, be instituted.
A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he
should put the question, Docr. FRANKLIN observed that it was
a point of great importance and wished that the gentlemen would
deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put.
Mr. RUTLIDGE animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen
on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed
themselves precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions
from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all
the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single
person, tho’ he was not for giving him the power of war and peace.
A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer
the public affairs best.
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Mr. SHERMAN said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the
Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the
depositary of the supreme will of the Society. As they were the best
judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive
department, and consequently of the number necessary from time
to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed but
that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as
experience might dictate.
Mr. WILSON preferred a single magistrate, as giving most
energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in
defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were
of Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The
only powers he conceived strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.
Mr. GERRY favored the policy of annexing a Council to the
Executive in order to give weight & inspire confidence. Mr. RANDOLPH strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy.
He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the British Governmt. as our prototype. He
did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If
we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be
opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America required
a different form of Government. He could not see why the great
requisites for the Executive department, vigor, despatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The
Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order to
support its independence to consist of more than one.
Mr. WILSON said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model
which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent
of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing
but a great confederated Republic would do for it. Mr. Wilson’s
motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent,
the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the
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first part of the clause agreed to, viz-”that a National Executive be
instituted.”
Mr. MADISON thought it would be proper, before a choice
shd. be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to
fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers
were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that departmt. whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of
their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they
might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved
that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the
powers of the Executive shd. be struck out & that after the words
“that a national Executive ought to be instituted” there be inserted
the words following viz. “with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided
for, and to execute such other powers “not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature,” as may from time to time be delegated by
the national Legislature.” The words “not legislative nor judiciary
in their nature” were added to the proposed amendment in consequence of a suggestion by Genl. Pinkney that improper powers
might otherwise be delegated.
Mr. WILSON seconded this motionMr. PINKNEY moved to amend the amendment by striking
out the last member of it; viz: “and to execute such other powers
not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to
time be delegated.” He said they were unnecessary, the object of
them being included in the “power to carry into effect the national
laws.”
Mr. RANDOLPH seconded the motion.
Mr. MADISON did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words-”to appoint to offices
&c. the whole being perhaps included in the first member of the
proposition. He did not however see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to
prevent doubts and misconstructions.
In consequence of the motion of Mr. Pinkney, the question
on Mr. Madison’s motion was divided; and the words objected to
by Mr. Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y. N.
J. Pena. Del. N. C. & Geo. agst. Mass. Virga. & S. Carolina the
preceding part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut
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divided, all the other States in the affirmative. The next clause in
Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration
of, the Executive being under consideration,
Mr. WILSON said he was almost unwilling to declare the
mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it
might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in
theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Massts., shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful
mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose
merits have general notoriety.
Mr. SHERMAN was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it
was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of
the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the
very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.
Mr. WILSON moves that the blank for the term of duration
should be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he
preferred this short period, on the supposition that a reeligibility
would be provided for.
Mr. PINKNEY moves for seven years.
Mr. SHERMAN was for three years, and agst. the doctrine
of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualifyed to execute its duties.
Mr. MASON was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting
a re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect
of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit
characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment.
Mr. BEDFORD was strongly opposed to so long a term as
seven years. He begged the committee to consider what the situation of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be
saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that
he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose
them after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no
cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only,
not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.
On the question for seven years, Massts. dividd. Cont. no. N.
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Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pena. ay. Del. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor.
no. There being 5ays, 4 noes, 1 divd., a question was asked whether
a majority had voted in the affirmative? The President decided that
it was an affirmative vote.
The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.
Mr. WILSON renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both
branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order
to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as
of the States;
Col. MASON favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He
wishes however that Mr. Wilson might have time to digest it into
his own form.-the clause “to be chosen by the National Legislature”-was accordingly postponed.Mr. RUTLIDGE suggests an election of the Executive by
the second branch only of the national Legislature.
The Committee then rose and the House
Adjourned.
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Thursday July 19, 1787
IN CONVENTION
On reconsideration of the vote rendering the Executive re-eligible
a 2d. time, Mr. MARTIN moved to reinstate the words, “to be
ineligible a 2d. time.”
Mr. GOVERNEUR MORRIS. It is necessary to take into
one view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; on
the due formation of which must depend the efficacy & utility of
the Union among the present and future States. It has been a maxim in Political Science that Republican Government is not adapted
to a large extent of Country, because the energy of the Executive
Magistracy can not reach the extreme parts of it. Our Country is
an extensive one. We must either then renounce the blessings of
the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade
every part of it. This subject was of so much importance that he
hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it. One great object of
the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The Legislature will
continually seek to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves; and will
seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion or convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive
Magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower
classes, agst. Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy
who in the course of things will necessarily compose the Legislative body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind & to nourish its love
of power, and to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to
be the spirit of the opulent. The check provided in the 2d. branch
was not meant as a check on Legislative usurpations of power, but
on the abuse of lawful powers, on the propensity in the 1st. branch
to legislate too much to run into projects of paper money & similar
expedients. It is no check on Legislative tyranny. On the contrary
it may favor it, and if the 1st. branch can be seduced may find the
means of success. The Executive therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector of the Mass of the people. -It is
the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers & to command
the forces of the Republic: to appoint 1. ministerial officers for the
administration of public affairs. 2. officers for the dispensation of
Justice. Who will be the best Judges whether these appointments
be well made? The people at large, who will know, will see, will feel

81

the effects of them. Again who can judge so well of the discharge of
military duties for the protection & security of the people, as the
people themselves who are to be protected & secured? -He finds
too that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What effect will this
have?
1. it will destroy the great incitement to merit public esteem
by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment.
It may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest passions in the
human breast. The love of fame is the great spring to noble & illustrious actions. Shut the Civil road to Glory & he may be compelled
to seek it by the sword.
2. It will tempt him to make the most of the short space of
time allotted him, to accumulate wealth and provide for his friends.
3. It will produce violations of the very constitution it is
meant to secure. In moments of pressing danger the tried abilities and established character of a favorite Magistrate will prevail
over respect for the forms of the Constitution. The Executive is
also to be impeachable. This is a dangerous part of the plan. It
will hold him in such dependence that he will be no check on the
Legislature, will not be a firm guardian of the people and of the
public interest. He will be the tool of a faction, of some leading
demagogue in the Legislature. These then are the faults of the Executive establishment as now proposed. Can no better establishmt.
be devised? If he is to be the Guardian of the people let him be appointed by the people? If he is to be a check on the Legislature let
him not be impeachable. Let him be of short duration, that he may
with propriety be re-eligible. It has been said that the candidates
for this office will not be known to the people. If they be known
to the Legislature, they must have such a notoriety and eminence
of Character, that they can not possibly be unknown to the people
at large. It cannot be possible that a man shall have sufficiently
distinguished himself to merit this high trust without having his
character proclaimed by fame throughout the Empire. As to the
danger from an unimpeachable magistrate he could not regard it
as formidable. There must be certain great officers of State; a minister of finance, of war, of foreign affairs &c. These he presumes
will exercise their functions in subordination to the Executive, and
will be amenable by impeachment to the public Justice. Without
these ministers the Executive can do nothing of consequence. He
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suggested a biennial election of the Executive at the time of electing the 1st. branch, and the Executive to hold over, so as to prevent
any interregnum in the administration. An election by the people
at large throughout so great an extent of country could not be influenced, by those little combinations and those momentary lies
which often decide popular elections within a narrow sphere. It
will probably, be objected that the election will be influenced by
the members of the Legislature; particularly of the 1st. branch,
and that it will be nearly the same thing with an election by the
Legislature itself. It could not be denied that such an influence
would exist. But it might be answered that as the Legislature or the
candidates for it would be divided, the enmity of one part would
counteract the friendship of another: that if the administration of
the Executive were good, it would be unpopular to oppose his reelection, if bad it ought to be opposed & a reappointmt. prevented;
and lastly that in every view this indirect dependence on the favor
of the Legislature could not be so mischievous as a direct dependence for his appointment. He saw no alternative for making the
Executive independent of the Legislature but either to give him his
office for life, or make him eligible by the people-Again, it might
be objected that two years would be too short a duration. But he
believes that as long as he should behave himself well, he would
be continued in his place. The extent of the Country would secure
his re-election agst. the factions & discontents of particular States.
It deserved consideration also that such an ingredient in the plan
would render it extremely palatable to the people. These were the
general ideas which occurred to him on the subject, and which led
him to wish & move that the whole constitution of the Executive
might undergo reconsideration.
Mr. RANDOLPH urged the motion of Mr. L. Martin for restoring the words making the Executive ineligible a 2d. time. If he
ought to be independent, he should not be left under a temptation
to court a re-appointment. If he should be re- appointable by the
Legislature, he will be no check on it. His revisionary power will be
of no avail. He had always thought & contended as he still did that
the danger apprehended by the little States was chimerical; but
those who thought otherwise ought to be peculiarly anxious for
the motion. If the Executive be appointed, as has been determined,
by the Legislature, he will probably be appointed either by joint
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ballot of both houses, or be nominated by the 1st. and appointed
by the 2d. branch. In either case the large States will preponderate.
If he is to court the same influence for his re-appointment, will
he not make his revisionary power, and all the other functions of
his administration subservient to the views of the large States. Besides, is there not great reason to apprehend that in case he should
be re-eligible, a false complaisance in the Legislature might lead
them to continue an unfit man in office in preference to a fit one.
It has been said that a constitutional bar to reappointment will
inspire unconstitutional endeavours to perpetuate himself. It may
be answered that his endeavours can have no effect unless the people be corrupt to such a degree as to render all precautions hopeless: to which may be added that this argument supposes him to
be more powerful & dangerous, than other arguments which have
been used, admit, and consequently calls for stronger fetters on his
authority. He thought an election by the Legislature with an incapacity to be elected a second time would be more acceptable to the
people that the plan suggested by Mr. Govr. Morris.
Mr. KING. did not like the ineligibility. He thought there
was great force in the remark of Mr. Sherman, that he who has
proved himself to be most fit for an Office, ought not to be excluded by the constitution from holding it. He would therefore
prefer any other reasonable plan that could be substituted. He was
much disposed to think that in such cases the people at large would
chuse wisely. There was indeed some difficulty arising from the
improbability of a general concurrence of the people in favor of
any one man. On the whole he was of opinion that an appointment
by electors chosen by the people for the purpose, would be liable
to fewest objections.
Mr. PATTERSON’s ideas nearly coincided he said with
those of Mr. King. He proposed that the Executive should be appointed by Electors to be chosen by the States in a ratio that would
allow one elector to the smallest and three to the largest States. Mr.
WILSON. It seems to be the unanimous sense that the Executive
should not be appointed by the Legislature, unless he be rendered
in-eligible a 2d. time: he perceived with pleasure that the idea was
gaining ground, of an election mediately or immediately by the
people.
Mr. MADISON. If it be a fundamental principle of free
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Govt. that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers should
be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be independently
exercised. There is the same & perhaps greater reason why the
Executive shd. be independent of the Legislature, than why the
Judiciary should: A coalition of the two former powers would be
more immediately & certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is essential then that the appointment of the Executive should either
be drawn from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give
him a free agency with regard to the Legislature. This could not be
if he was to be appointable from time to time by the Legislature. It
was not clear that an appointment in the 1st. instance even with an
eligibility afterwards would not establish an improper connection
between the two departments. Certain it was that the appointment
would be attended with intrigues and contentions that ought not
to be unnecessarily admitted. He was disposed for these reasons to
refer the appointment to some other source. The people at large
was in his opinion the fittest in itself. It would be as likely as any
that could be devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character. The people generally could only know &
vote for some Citizen whose merits had rendered him an object of
general attention & esteem. There was one difficulty however of a
serious nature attending an immediate choice by the people. The
right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than
the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the
election on the score of the Negroes. The substitution of electors
obviated this difficulty and seemed on the whole to be liable to
fewest objections.
Mr. GERRY. If the Executive is to be elected by the Legislature he certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This would make
him absolutely dependent. He was agst. a popular election. The
people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing
men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of the Executive
by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives. The people of
the States will then choose the 1st. branch: The legislatures of the
States the 2d. branch of the National Legislature, and the Executives of the States, the National Executive. This he thought would
form a strong attachnt. in the States to the National System. The
popular mode of electing the chief Magistrate would certainly be
the worst of all. If he should be so elected & should do his duty, he
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will be turned out for it like Govr. Bowdoin in Massts. & President
Sullivan in N. Hamshire.
On the question on Mr. Govr. Morris motion to reconsider
generally the constitution of the Executive. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay
& all the others ay.
Mr. ELSEWORTH moved to strike out the appointmt. by
the Natl. Legislature, and insert “to be chosen by electors appointed, by the Legislatures of the States in the following ratio; towit-one for each State not exceeding 200,000 inhabts. two for each
above yt. number & not exceeding 300,000. and three for each
State exceeding 300,000.
Mr. BROOME 2ded. the motion
Mr. RUTLIDGE was opposed to all the modes except the
appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature. He will be sufficiently independent, if he be not re-eligible.
Mr. GERRY preferred the motion of Mr. Elseworth to an
appointmt. by the Natl. Legislature, or by the people; tho’ not to
an appt. by the State Executives. He moved that the electors proposed by Mr. E. should be 25 in number, and allotted in the following proportion. to N. H. 1. to Mas. 3. to R. I. 1. to Cont. 2. to
N. Y. 2. N. J. 2. Pa. 3. Del. 1. Md. 2. Va. 3. N. C. 2. S. C. 2. Geo. 1.
The question as moved by Mr. Elseworth being divided, on
the 1st. part shall ye. Natl. Executive be appointed by Electors?
Mas. divd. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no.
S. C. no. Geo. no.
On 2d. part shall the Electors be chosen by State Legislatures? Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N.
C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The part relating to the ratio in which the States sd. chuse
electors was postponed nem. con.
Mr. L. MARTIN moved that the Executive be ineligible a
2d. time.
Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ds. the motion. He had no great confidence in the Electors to be chosen for the special purpose. They
would not be the most respectable citizens; but persons not occupied in the high offices of Govt. They would be liable to undue
influence, which might the more readily be practised as some of
them will probably be in appointment 6 or 8 months before the
object of it comes on.
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Mr. ELSEWORTH supposed any persons might be appointed Electors, excepting solely, members of the Natl. Legislature.
On the question shall he be ineligible a 2d. time? Mas. no.
Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. no.
On the question Shall the Executive continue for 7 years? It
passed in the negative Mas. divd. Cont. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no.
Md. no. Va. no. N. C. divd. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr. KING was afraid we shd. shorten the term too much.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS was for a short term, in order to avoid
impeachts. which wd.. be otherwise necessary.
Mr. BUTLER was agst. a frequency of the elections. Geo. &
S. C. were too distant to send electors often.
Mr. ELSEWORTH was for 6. years. If the elections be too
frequent, the Executive will not be firm eno’. There must be duties
which will make him unpopular for the moment. There will be
outs as well as ins. His administration therefore will be attacked
and misrepresented.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was for 6 years. The expence will be
considerable & ought not to be unnecessarily repeated. If the Elections are too frequent, the best men will not undertake the service
and those of an inferior character will be liable to be corrupted.
On question for 6 years? Mas. ay. Cont. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del.
no. Md
. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Adjourned
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Tuesday July 24, 1787
IN CONVENTION
The appointment of the Executive by Electors reconsidered.
Mr. HOUSTON moved that he be appointed by the “Natl.
Legislature,” instead of “Electors appointed by the State Legislatures” according to the last decision of the mode. He dwelt chiefly
on the improbability, that capable men would undertake the service of Electors from the more distant States.
Mr. SPAIGHT seconded the motion.
Mr. GERRY opposed it. He thought there was no ground
to apprehend the danger urged by Mr. Houston. The election of
the Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance
and will excite great earnestness. The best men, the Governours
of the States will not hold it derogatory from their character to be
the electors. If the motion should be agreed to, it will be necessary
to make the Executive ineligible a 2d. time, in order to render him
independent of the Legislature; which was an idea extremely repugnant to his way of thinking.
Mr. STRONG supposed that there would be no necessity, if
the Executive should be appointed by the Legislature, to make him
ineligible a 2d. time; as new elections of the Legislature will have
intervened; and he will not depend for his 2d. appointment on the
same sett of men as his first was recd. from. It had been suggested
that gratitude for his past appointment wd. produce the same effect
as dependence for his future appointment. He thought very differently. Besides this objection would lie agst. the Electors who would
be objects of gratitude as well as the Legislature. It was of great
importance not to make the Govt. too complex which would be
the case if a new sett of men like the Electors should be introduced
into it. He thought also that the first characters in the States would
not feel sufficient motives to undertake the office of Electors.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was for going back to the original
ground; to elect the Executive for 7 years and render him ineligible a 2d. time. The proposed Electors would certainly not be men
of the 1st. nor even of the 2d. grade in the States. These would all
prefer a seat either in the Senate or the other branch of the Legislature. He did not like the Unity in the Executive. He had wished
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the Executive power to be lodged in three men taken from three
districts into which the States should be divided. As the Executive
is to have a kind of veto on the laws, and there is an essential difference of interests between the N. & S. States, particularly in the
carrying trade, the power will be dangerous, if the Executive is to
be taken from part of the Union, to the part from which he is not
taken. The case is different here from what it is in England; where
there is a sameness of interests throughout the Kingdom. Another
objection agst. a single Magistrate is that he will be an elective
King, and will feel the spirit of one. He will spare no pains to keep
himself in for life, and will then lay a train for the succession of his
children. It was pretty certain he thought that we should at some
time or other have a King; but he wished no precaution to be omitted that might postpone the event as long as possible. -Ineligibility
a 2d. time appeared to him to be the best precaution. With this
precaution he had no objection to a longer term than 7 years. He
would go as far as 10 or 12 years.
Mr. GERRY moved that the Legislatures of the States
should vote by ballot for the Executive in the same proportions as
it had been proposed they should chuse electors; and that in case
a majority of the votes should not center on the same person, the
1st. branch of the Natl. Legislature should chuse two out of the 4
candidates having most votes, and out of these two, the 2d. branch
should chuse the Executive.
Mr. KING seconded the motion-and on the Question to
postpone in order to take it into consideration. The noes were so
predominant, that the States were not counted.
Question on Mr. Houston’s motion that the Executive be
appd. by Nal. Legislature
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Mr. L. MARTIN & Mr. GERRY moved to re-instate the
ineligibility of the Executive a 2d. time.
Mr. ELSEWORTH. With many this appears a natural consequence of his being elected by the Legislature. It was not the
case with him. The Executive he thought should be reelected if
his conduct proved him worthy of it. And he will be more likely to
render himself, worthy of it if he be rewardable with it. The most
eminent characters also will be more willing to accept the trust
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under this condition, than if they foresee a necessary degradation
at a fixt period.
Mr. GERRY. That the Executive shd. be independent of the
Legislature is a clear point. The longer the duration of his appointment the more will his dependence be diminished. It will be better
then for him to continue 10, 15, or even 20, years and be ineligible
afterwards.
Mr. KING was for making him re-eligible. This is too great
an advantage to be given up for the small effect it will have on his
dependence, if impeachments are to lie. He considered these as
rendering the tenure during pleasure.
Mr. L. MARTIN, suspending his motion as to the ineligibility, moved “that the appointmt. of the Executive shall continue for
Eleven years.
Mr. GERRY suggested fifteen years
Mr. KING twenty years. This is the medium life of princes.
Mr. DAVIE Eight years
Mr. WILSON. The difficulties & perplexities into which
the House is thrown proceed from the election by the Legislature
which he was sorry had been reinstated. The inconveniency of this
mode was such that he would agree to almost any length of time
in order to get rid of the dependence which must result from it.
He was persuaded that the longest term would not be equivalent
to a proper mode of election; unless indeed it should be during
good behaviour. It seemed to be supposed that at a certain advance
in life, a continuance in office would cease to be agreeable to the
officer, as well as desirable to the public. Experience had shewn in
a variety of instances that both a capacity & inclination for public
service existed-in very advanced stages. He mentioned the instance
of a Doge of Venice who was elected after he was 80 years of age.
The popes have generally been elected at very advanced periods,
and yet in no case had a more steady or a better concerted policy
been pursued than in the Court of Rome. If the Executive should
come into office at 35. years of age, which he presumes may happen & his continuance should be fixt at 15 years. at the age of 50.
in the very prime of life, and with all the aid of experience, he must
be cast aside like a useless hulk. What an irreparable loss would
the British Jurisprudence have sustained, had the age of 50. been
fixt there as the ultimate limit of capacity or readiness to serve
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the public. The great luminary [Ld. Mansfield] held his seat for
thirty years after his arrival at that age. Notwithstanding what had
been done he could not but hope that a better mode of election
would yet be adopted; and one that would be more agreeable to the
general sense of the House. That time might be given for further
deliberation he wd. move that the present question be postponed
till tomorrow.
Mr. BROOM seconded the motion to postpone.
Mr. GERRY. We seem to be entirely at a loss on this head.
He would suggest whether it would not be adviseable to refer the
clause relating to the Executive to the Committee of detail to be
appointed. Perhaps they will be able to hit on something that may
unite the various opinions which have been thrown out.
Mr. WILSON. As the great difficulty seems to spring from
the mode of election, he wd. suggest a mode which had not been
mentioned. It was that the Executive be elected for 6 years by a
small number, not more than 15 of the Natl. Legislature, to be
drawn from it, not by ballot, but by lot and who should retire immediately and make the election without separating. By this mode
intrigue would be avoided in the first instance, and the dependence
would be diminished. This was not he said a digested idea and
might be liable to strong objections.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS. Of all possible modes of appointment
that by the Legislature is the worst. If the Legislature is to appoint,
and to impeach or to influence the impeachment, the Executive will
be the mere creature of it. He had been opposed to the impeachment but was now convinced that impeachments must be provided
for, if the appt. was to be of any duration. No man wd. say, that
an Executive known to be in the pay of an Enemy, should not be
removeable in some way or other. He had been charged heretofore
[by Col. Mason] with inconsistency in pleading for confidence in
the Legislature on some occasions, & urging a distrust on others.
The charge was not well founded. The Legislature is worthy of unbounded confidence in some respects, and liable to equal distrust
in others. When their interest coincides precisely with that of their
Constituents, as happens in many of their Acts, no abuse of trust
is to be apprehended. When a strong personal interest happens to
be opposed to the general interest, the Legislature can not be too
much distrusted. In all public bodies there are two parties. The
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Executive will necessarily be more connected with one than with
the other. There will be a personal interest therefore in one of the
parties to oppose as well as in the other to support him. Much had
been said of the intrigues that will be practised by the Executive
to get into office. Nothing had been said on the other side of the
intrigues to get him out of office. Some leader of party will always
covet his seat, will perplex his administration, will cabal with the
Legislature, till he succeeds in supplanting him. This was the way
in which the King of England was got out, he meant the real King,
the Minister. This was the way in which Pitt [Ld. Chatham] forced
himself into place. Fox was for pushing the matter still farther. If
he carried his India bill, which he was very near doing, he would
have made the Minister, the King in form almost as well as in substance. Our President will be the British Minister, yet we are about
to make him appointable by the Legislature. Something had been
said of the danger of Monarchy. If a good government should not
now be formed, if a good organization of the Execuve should not
be provided, he doubted whether we should not have something
worse than a limited Monarchy. In order to get rid of the dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, the expedient of making
him ineligible a 2d. time had been devised. This was as much as to
say we shd. give him the benefit of experience, and then deprive
ourselves of the use of it. But make him ineligible a 2d. time-and
prolong his duration even to 15- years, will he by any wonderful
interposition of providence at that period cease to be a man? No he
will be unwilling to quit his exaltation, the road to his object thro’
the Constitution will be shut; he will be in possession of the sword,
a civil war will ensue, and the Commander of the victorious army
on which ever side, will be the despot of America. This consideration renders him particularly anxious that the Executive should
be properly constituted. The vice here would not, as in some other
parts of the system be curable. It is the most difficult of all rightly
to balance the Executive. Make him too weak: The Legislature will
usurp his powers: Make him too strong. He will usurp on the Legislature. He preferred a short period, a re-eligibility, but a different
mode of election. A long period would prevent an adoption of the
plan: it ought to do so. He shd. himself be afraid to trust it. He
was not prepared to decide on Mr. Wilson’s mode of election just
hinted by him. He thought it deserved consideration It would be
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better that chance sd. decide than intrigue.
On a question to postpone the consideration of the Resolution on the subject of the Executive
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. divd. Md. ay.
Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr. WILSON then moved that the Executive be chosen every ------- years by ------- Electors to be taken by lot from the
Natl Legislature who shall proceed immediately to the choice of
the Executive and not separate until it be made.”
Mr. CARROL 2ds. the motion
Mr. GERRY. this is committing too much to chance. If the
lot should fall on a sett of unworthy men, an unworthy Executive
must be saddled on the Country. He thought it had been demonstrated that no possible mode of electing by the Legislature could
be a good one.
Mr. KING. The lot might fall on a majority from the same
State which wd. ensure the election of a man from that State. We
ought to be governed by reason, not by chance. As nobody seemed
to be satisfied, he wished the matter to be postponed
Mr. WILSON did not move this as the best mode. His opinion remained unshaken that we ought to resort to the people for
the election. He seconded the postponement.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS observed that the chances were almost
infinite agst. a majority of electors from the same State.
On a question whether the last motion was in order, it was
determined in the affirmative; 7. ays. 4 noes.
On the question of postponent. it was agreed to nem. con.
Mr. CARROL took occasion to observe that he considered
the clause declaring that direct taxation on the States should be
in proportion to representation, previous to the obtaining an actual census, as very objectionable, and that he reserved to himself
the right of opposing it, if the Report of the Committee of detail
should leave it in the plan.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS hoped the Committee would strike out
the whole of the clause proportioning direct taxation to representation. He had only meant it as a bridge to assist us over a certain
gulph; having passed the gulph the bridge may be removed. He
thought the principle laid down with so much strictness, liable to
strong objections
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On a ballot for a Committee to report a Constitution conformable to the Resolutions passed by the Convention, the members chosen were Mr. Rutlidge, Mr. Randolph, Mr. Ghorum, Mr.
Elseworth, Mr. WilsonOn motion to discharge the Come. of the whole from the
propositions submitted to the Convention by Mr. C. Pinkney as
the basis of a constitution, and to refer them to the Committee of
detail just appointed, it was agd. to nem: con.
A like motion was then made & agreed to nem: con: with
respect to the propositions of Mr. Patterson
Adjourned.
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Tuesday July 25, 1787
IN CONVENTION
Clause relating to the Executive again under consideration.
Mr. ELSEWORTH moved “that the Executive be appointed by the Legislature,” except when the magistrate last chosen shall
have continued in office the whole term for which he was chosen,
& be reeligible, in which case the choice shall be by Electors appointed by the Legislatures of the States for that purpose.” By this
means a deserving magistrate may be reelected without making
him dependent on the Legislature.
Mr. GERRY repeated his remark that an election at all by the
Natl. Legislature was radically and incurably wrong; and moved
that the Executive be appointed by the Governours & Presidents
of the States, with advice of their Councils, and where there are no
Councils by Electors chosen by the Legislatures. The executives to
vote in the following proportions: vizMr. MADISON. There are objections agst. every mode that
has been, or perhaps can be proposed. The election must be made
either by some existing authority under the Natil. or State Constitutions-or by some special authority derived from the people-or
by the people themselves. -The two Existing authorities under the
Natl. Constitution wd. be the Legislative & Judiciary. The latter he
presumed was out of the question. The former was in his Judgment
liable to insuperable objections. Besides the general influence of
that mode on the independence of the Executive, 1. the election
of the Chief Magistrate would agitate & divide the legislature so
much that the public interest would materially suffer by it. Public
bodies are always apt to be thrown into contentions, but into more
violent ones by such occasions than by any others. 2. the candidate
would intrigue with the Legislature, would derive his appointment
from the predominant faction, and be apt to render his administration subservient to its views. 3. The Ministers of foreign powers
would have and make use of, the opportunity to mix their intrigues
& influence with the Election. Limited as the powers of the Executive are, it will be an object of great moment with the great rival
powers of Europe who have American possessions, to have at the
head of our Governmt. a man attached to their respective poli-
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tics & interests. No pains, nor perhaps expense, will be spared, to
gain from the Legislature an appointmt. favorable to their wishes.
Germany & Poland are witnesses of this danger. In the former,
the election of the Head of the Empire, till it became in a manner hereditary, interested all Europe, and was much influenced by
foreign interference. In the latter, altho’ the elective Magistrate
has very little real power, his election has at all times produced
the most eager interference of forign princes, and has in fact at
length slid entirely into foreign hands. The existing authorities in
the States are the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary. The appointment of the Natl. Executive by the first, was objectionable in many
points of view, some of which had been already mentioned. He
would mention one which of itself would decide his opinion. The
Legislatures of the States had betrayed a strong propensity to a
variety of pernicious measures. One object of the Natl. Legislre.
was to controul this propensity. One object of the Natl. Executive,
so far as it would have a negative on the laws, was to controul the
Natl. Legislature, so far as it might be infected with a similar propensity. Refer the appointmt. of the Natl. Executive to the State
Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be defeated. The
Legislatures can & will act with some kind of regular plan, and will
promote the appointmt. of a man who will not oppose himself to
a favorite object. Should a majority of the Legislatures at the time
of election have the same object, or different objects of the same
kind, The Natl. Executive would be rendered subservient to them.
-An appointment by the State Executives, was liable among other
objections to this insuperable one, that being standing bodies, they
could & would be courted, and intrigued with by the Candidates,
by their partizans, and by the Ministers of foreign powers. The
State Judiciarys had not & he presumed wd. not be proposed as
a proper source of appointment. The option before us then lay
between an appointment by Electors chosen by the people-and
an immediate appointment by the people. He thought the former
mode free from many of the objections which had been urged agst.
it, and greatly preferable to an appointment by the Natl. Legislature. As the electors would be chosen for the occasion, would meet
at once, & proceed immediately to an appointment, there would
be very little opportunity for cabal, or corruption. As a farther precaution, it might be required that they should meet at some place,
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distinct from the seat of Govt. and even that no person within a
certain distance of the place at the time shd. be eligible. This Mode
however had been rejected so recently & by so great a majority that it probably would not be proposed anew. The remaining
mode was an election by the people or rather by the qualified part
of them, at large: With all its imperfections he liked this best. He
would not repeat either the general argumts. for or the objections
agst. this mode. He would only take notice of two difficulties which
he admitted to have weight. The first arose from the disposition in
the people to prefer a Citizen of their own State, and the disadvantage this wd. throw on the smaller States. Great as this objection
might be he did not think it equal to such as lay agst. every other
mode which had been proposed. He thought too that some expedient might be hit upon that would obviate it. The second difficulty
arose from the disproportion of qualified voters in the N. & S.
States, and the disadvantages which this mode would throw on the
latter. The answer to this objection was 1. that this disproportion
would be continually decreasing under the influence of the Republican laws introduced in the S. States, and the more rapid increase
of their population. 2. That local considerations must give way to
the general interest. As an individual from the S. States he was
willing to make the sacrifice.
Mr. ELSEWORTH. The objection drawn from the different sizes of the States, is unanswerable. The Citizens of the largest
States would invariably prefer the Candidate within the State; and
the largest States wd. invariably have the man.
Question on Mr. Elseworth’s motion as above.
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr. PINKNEY moved that the election by the Legislature
be qualified with a proviso that no person be eligible for more than
6 years in any twelve years. He thought this would have all the
advantage & at the same time avoid in some degree the inconveniency, of an absolute ineligibility a 2d. time.
Col. MASON approved the idea. It had the sanction of experience in the instance of Congs. and some of the Executives of the
States. It rendered the Executive as effectually independent, as an
ineligibility after his first election, and opened the way at the same
time for the advantage of his future services. He preferred on the
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whole the election by the Nati. Legislature: Tho’ Candor obliged
him to admit, that there was great danger of foreign influence, as
had been suggested. This was the most serious objection with him
that had been urged.
Mr. BUTLER. The two great evils to be avoided are cabal at
home, & influence from abroad. It will be difficult to avoid either
if the Election be made by the Natl. Legislature. On the other
hand: The Govt. should not be made so complex & unwieldy as to
disgust the States. This would be the case, if the election shd. be referred to the people. He liked best an election by Electors chosen
by the Legislatures of the States. He was agst. are-eligibility at all
events. He was also agst. a ratio of votes in the States. An equality
should prevail in this case. The reasons for departing from it do
not hold in the case of the Executive as in that of the Legislature.
Mr. GERRY approved of Mr. Pinkney’s motion as lessening
the evil.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS was agst. a rotation in every case. It
formed a political School, in wch we were always governed by the
scholars, and not by the Masters. The evils to be guarded agst. in
this case are 1. the undue influence of the Legislature. 2. instability
of Councils. 3. misconduct in office. To guard agst. the first, we run
into the second evil. We adopt a rotation which produces instability of Councils. To avoid Sylla we fall into Charibdis. A change of
men is ever followed by a change of measures. We see this fully
exemplified in the vicissitudes among ourselves, particularly in the
State of Pena. The self-sufficiency of a victorious party scorns to
tread in the paths of their predecessors. Rehoboam will not imitate
Soloman. 2. the Rotation in office will not prevent intrigue and dependence on the Legislature. The man in office will look forward
to the period at which he will become re-eligible. The distance of
the period, the improbability of such a protraction of his life will be
no obstacle. Such is the nature of man, formed by his benevolent
author no doubt for wise ends, that altho’ he knows his existence
to be limited to a span, he takes his measures as if he were to live
for ever. But taking another supposition, the inefficacy of the expedient will be manifest. If the magistrate does not look forward
to his re-election to the Executive, he will be pretty sure to keep
in view the opportunity of his going into the Legislature itself. He
will have little objection then to an extension of power on a theatre
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where he expects to act a distinguished part; and will be very unwilling to take any step that may endanger his popularity with the
Legislature, on his influence over which the figure he is to make
will depend. 3. To avoid the third evil, impeachments will be essential, and hence an additional reason agst. an election by the Legislature. He considered an election by the people as the best, by the
Legislature as the worst, mode. Putting both these aside, he could
not but favor the idea of Mr. Wilson, of introducing a mixture of
lot. It will diminish, if not destroy both cabal & dependence.
Mr. WILLIAMSON was sensible that strong objections lay
agst. an election of the Executive by the Legislature, and that it
opened a door for foreign influence. The principal objection agst.
an election by the people seemed to be, the disadvantage under
which it would place the smaller States. He suggested as a cure for
this difficulty, that each man should vote for 3 candidates, One of
these he observed would be probably of his own State, the other
2. of some other States; and as probably of a small as a large one.
Mr. Govr. MORRIS liked the idea, suggesting as an amendment that each man should vote for two persons one of whom at
least should not be of his own State.
Mr. MADISON also thought something valuable might be
made of the suggestion with the proposed amendment of it. The
second best man in this case would probably be the first, in fact.
The only objection which occurred was that each Citizen after
havg. given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen, wd. throw away
his second on some obscure Citizen of another State, in order to
ensure the object of his first choice. But it could hardly be supposed that the Citizens of many States would be so sanguine of
having their favorite elected, as not to give their second vote with
sincerity to the next object of their choice. It might moreover be
provided in favor of the smaller States that the Executive should
not be eligible more than times in years from the same State.
Mr. GERRY. A popular election in this case is radically vicious. The ignorance of the people would put it in the power of
some one set of men dispersed through the Union & acting in
Concert to delude them into any appointment. He observed that
such a Society of men existed in the Order of the Cincinnati. They
are respectable, United, and influencial. They will in fact elect the
chief Magistrate in every instance, if the election be referred to
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the people. His respect for the characters composing this Society
could not blind him to the danger & impropriety of throwing such
a power into their hands.
Mr. DICKENSON. As far as he could judge from the discussions which had taken place during his attendance, insuperable objections lay agst. an election of the Executive by the Natl.
Legislature; as also by the Legislatures or Executives of the States.
He had long leaned towards an election by the people which he
regarded as the best & purest source. Objections he was aware
lay agst. this mode, but not so great he thought as agst. the other
modes. The greatest difficulty in the opinion of the House seemed
to arise from the partiality of the States to their respective Citizens.
But, might not this very partiality be turned to a useful purpose.
Let the people of each State chuse its best Citizen. The people will
know the most eminent characters of their own States, and the
people of different States will feel an emulation in selecting those
of which they will have the greatest reason to be proud. Out of the
thirteen names thus selected, an Executive Magistrate may be chosen either by the Natl. Legislature, or by Electors appointed by it.
On a Question which was moved for postponing Mr. Pinkney’s motion; in order to make way for some such proposition as
had been hinted by Mr. Williamson & others: it passed in the negative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va.
ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On Mr. Pinkney’s motion that no person shall serve in the
Executive more than 6 years in 12. years, it passed in the negative.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va.
no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On a motion that the members of the Committee be furnished with copies of the proceedings it was so determined; S. Carolina alone being in the negative.
It was then moved that the members of the House might take
copies of the Resolions which had been agreed to; which passed in
the negative. N. H. no. Mas. no. Con: ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay.
Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
Mr. GERRY & Mr. BUTLER moved to refer the resolution
relating to the Executive (except the clause making it consist of a
single person) to the Committee of detail
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Mr. WILSON hoped that so important a branch of the System wd. not be committed untill a general principle shd. be fixed
by a vote of the House.
Mr. LANGDON, was for the Commitment-Adjd.

Document 2
U.S. Constitution : Article II
Section 1- President: his term of office. Electors of President; number and how appointed. Electors to vote on same
day. Qualification of President. On whom his duties devolve
in case of his removal, death, etc. President’s compensation.
His oath of office.
1. The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold office during the term of four
years, and together with the Vice President, chosen for the same
term, be elected as follows:
2. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature may
direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an
office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed
an elector. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote
by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant
of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the
persons voted for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of Government of the United States, directed to the
President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence
of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and
the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number
of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such
majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President;
and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list
the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing
the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from
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each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a
member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all
the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of
the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more
who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice
President. (The clause in italics was superseded by Ammendment
XII)
3. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors,
and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be
the same throughout the United States.
4. No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution,
shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person
be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age
of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the
United States.
5. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties
of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and
the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice President,
declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer
shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected. (This clause has been modified by Amendment
XX and Amendment XXV)
6. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a
compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished
during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he
shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the
United States, or any of them.
7. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the
following oath or affirmation:
“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
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office of the President of the United States, and will to the best of
my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States.”
Section 2 - President to be Commander-in-Chief. He may
require opinions of cabinet officers, etc., may pardon. Treaty-making power. Nomination of certain officers. When President may fill vacancies.
1. The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States,
when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the
executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of
their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves
and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases
of impeachment.
2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but
the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior
officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts
of law, or in the heads of departments.
3. The President shall have the power to fill up all vacancies that
may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next session.
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Section 3 - President shall communicate to Congress. He may
convene and adjourn Congress, in case of disagreement, etc.
Shall receive ambassadors, execute laws, and commission officers.
He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of
the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such
measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on
extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them,
and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the
time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall
think proper; he may receive ambassadors, and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall
commission all the officers of the United States.
Section 4 - All civil offices forfeited for certain crimes.
The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United
States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

Document 3
Federalist Paper No. 68
The Mode of Electing the President from the New York Packet.
Friday, March 14, 1788.
To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the
United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has
received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.
The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even
deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well
guarded.1 I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm,
that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It
unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which
was to be wished for.
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate
in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to
be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of
making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by
the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should
be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to
the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number
of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass,
will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity
as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be
dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so import-
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ant an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so
happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an
effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL,
to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to
convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final
object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each
State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less
to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them
to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in
one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.
These most deadly adversaries of republican government might
naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more
than one querter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to
gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief
magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against
all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to
depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered
with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it
in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America,
to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole
purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from
eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator,
representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit
under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors.
Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate
agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from
any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their
continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption,
when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires
time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to
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embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in
any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could
not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to
mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all
but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will
also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special
body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised
by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall
choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of
senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit
person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted
to the seat of the national government, and the person who may
happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the
President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen
to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a
majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency,
the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who
shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their
opinion may be best qualified for the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the
office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not
in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.
Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone
suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it
will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of
so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him
a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of
the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will
be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters
pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who
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are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration.
Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet
who says: “For forms of government let fools contest That which
is best administered is best,’’ yet we may safely pronounce, that
the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to
produce a good administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with
the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It
has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering
that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas
of the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times
the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary
that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the
senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that
of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the
State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The
other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally
become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive
magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election
prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to
the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this,
as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie
against the constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate,
and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties
similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
Pubius.

Document 4
Anti-Federalist Paper No. 68
On the Mode of Electing the President
From a speech by William Grayson given to the Virginia ratifying convention
on June 18, 1788.
Mr. [William] GRAYSON. Mr. Chairman, one great objection
with me is this: If we advert to..... [the] democratical, aristocratical, or executive branch, we shall find their powers are perpetually
varying and fluctuating throughout the whole. Perhaps the democratic branch would be well constructed, were it not for this defect.
The executive is still worse, in this respect, than the democratic
branch. He is to be elected by a number of electors in the country;
but the principle is changed when no person has a majority of the
whole number of electors appointed, or when more than one have
such a majority, and have an equal number of votes; for then the
lower house is to vote by states. It is thus changing throughout the
whole. It seems rather founded on accident than any principle of
government I ever heard of. We know that there scarcely ever was
an election of such an officer without the interposition of foreign
powers. Two causes prevail to make them intermeddle in such cases:-one is, to preserve the balance of power; the other, to preserve
their trade. These causes have produced interferences of foreign
powers in the election of the king of Poland. All the great powers of Europe have interfered in an election which took place not
very long ago, and would not let the people choose for themselves.
We know how much the powers of Europe have interfered with
Sweden. Since the death of Charles XII, that country has been a
republican government. Some powers were willing it should be so;
some were willing her imbecility should continue; others wished
the contrary; and at length the court of France brought about a
revolution, which converted it into an absolute government. Can
America be free from these interferences? France, after losing
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Holland, will wish to make America entirely her own. Great Britain will wish to increase her influence by a still closer connection.
It is the interest of Spain, from the contiguity of her possessions
in the western hemisphere to the United States, to be in an intimate connection with them, and influence their deliberations, if
possible. I think we have every thing, to apprehend from such interferences. It is highly probable the President will be continued
in office for life. To gain his favor, they will support him. Consider
the means of importance he will have by creating officers. If he has
a good understanding with the Senate, they will join to prevent a
discovery of his misdeeds. . . .
This quadrennial power cannot be justified by ancient history.
There is hardly an instance where a republic trusted its executive
so long with much power; nor is it warranted by modern republics.
The delegation of power is, in most of them, only for one year.
When you have a strong democratical and a strong aristocratical branch, you may have a strong executive. But when those are
weak, the balance will not be preserved, if you give the executive
extensive powers for so long a time. As this government is organized, it would be dangerous to trust the President with such powers. How will you punish him if he abuse his power? Will you call
him before the Senate? They are his counsellors and partners in
crime. Where are your checks? We ought to be extremely cautious
in this country. If ever the government be changed, it will probably
be into a despotism. The first object in England was to destroy the
monarchy; but the aristocratic branch restored him, and of course
the government was organized on its ancient principles. But were
a revolution to happen here, there would be no means of restoring
the government to its former organization. This is a caution to us
not to trust extensive powers. I have an extreme objection to the
mode of his election. I presume the seven Eastern States will always
elect him. As he is vested with the power of making treaties, and
as there is a material distinction between the carrying and productive states, the former will be disposed to have him to themselves.
He will accommodate himself to their interests in forming treaties,
and they will continue him perpetually in office. Thus mutual interest will lead them reciprocally to support one another. It will be
a government of a faction, and this observation will apply to every
part of it; for, having a majority, they may do what they please. I
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have made an estimate which shows with what facility they will be
able to reelect him. The number of electors is equal to the number
of representatives and senators; viz., ninety-one. They are to vote
for two persons. They give, therefore, one hundred and eighty-two
votes. Let there be forty-five votes for four different candidates,
and two for the President. He is one of the five highest, if he have
but two votes, which he may easily purchase. In this case, by the
3d clause of the lst section of the 2d article, the election is to be by
the representatives, according to states. Let New Hampshire be for
him,-a majority of its . . . . .
3 representatives is
2
Rhode Island		
1
1
Connecticut		
5
3
New Jersey		
4
3
Delaware		 1
1
Georgia		 3
2
North Carolina
5
3
A majority of seven states is 15 Thus the majority of seven
states is but 15, while the minority amounts to 50. The total number of voices (91 electors and 65 representatives) is . .
156 Voices in favor of the President are, 2 state electors and
15 representatives ..... 17
139 So that the President may be reelected by the voices of
17 against 139.
It may be said that this is an extravagant case, and will never
happen. In my opinion, it will often happen. A person who is a
favorite of Congress, if he gets but two votes of electors, may, by
the subsequent choice of 15 representatives, be elected President.
Surely the possibility of such a case ought to be excluded.

Document 5
Anti-Federalist Paper No. 72
On the Electoral College; On ReEligibility of the President
By an anonymous writer “REPUBLICUS,” appearing in The Kentucky
Gazette on March 1, 1788.
. . I go now to Art. 2, Sec. 1, which vest the supreme continental
executive power in a president-in order to the choice of whom,
the legislative body of each state is empowered to point out to
their constituents some mode of choice, or (to save trouble) may
choose themselves, a certain number of electors, who shall meet
in their respective states, and vote by ballot, for two persons, one
of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with
themselves. Or in other words, they shall vote for two, one or both
of whom they know nothing of. An extraordinary refinement this,
on the plain simple business of election; and of which the grand
convention have certainly the honor of being the first inventors;
and that for an officer too, of so much importance as a president
- invested with legislative and executive powers; who is to be commander in chief of the army, navy, militia, etc.; grant reprieves and
pardons; have a temporary negative on all bills and resolves; convene and adjourn both houses of congress; be supreme conservator
of laws; commission all officers; make treaties; and who is to continue four years, and is only removable on conviction of treason
or bribery, and triable only by the senate, who are to be his own
council, whose interest in every instance runs parallel with his own,
and who are neither the officers of the people, nor accountable to
them.
Is it then become necessary, that a free people should first
resign their right of suffrage into other hands besides their own,
and then, secondly, that they to whom they resign it should be
compelled to choose men, whose persons, characters, manners, or
principles they know nothing of? And, after all (excepting some
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such change as is not likely to happen twice in the same century)
to intrust Congress with the final decision at last? Is it necessary, is
it rational, that the sacred rights of mankind should thus dwindle
down to Electors of electors, and those again electors of other electors? This seems to be degrading them even below the prophetical
curse denounced by the good old patriarch, on the offspring of his
degenerate son: “servant of servants”. . .
Again I would ask (considering how prone mankind are to
engross power, and then to abuse it) is it not probable, at least
possible, that the president who is to be vested with all this demiomnipotence - who is not chosen by the community; and who
consequently, as to them, is irresponsible and independent-that
he, I say, by a few artful and dependent emissaries in Congress,
may not only perpetuate his own personal administration, but also
make it hereditary? By the same means, he may render his suspensive power over the laws as operative and permanent as that
of G. the 3d over the acts of the British parliament; and under the
modest title of president, may exercise the combined authority of
legislation and execution, in a latitude yet unthought of. Upon his
being invested with those powers a second or third time, he may
acquire such enormous influence-as, added to his uncontrollable
power over the army, navy, and militia; together with his private
interest in the officers of all these different departments, who are
all to be appointed by himself, and so his creatures, in the true
political sense of the word; and more especially when added to
all this, he has the power of forming treaties and alliances, and
calling them to his assistance-that he may, I say, under all these
advantages and almost irresistible temptations, on some pretended
pique, haughtily and contemptuously, turn our poor lower house
(the only shadow of liberty we shall have left) out of doors, and
give us law at the bayonet’s point. Or, may not the senate, who
are nearly in the same situation, with respect to the people, from
similar motives and by similar means, erect themselves easily into
an oligarchy, towards which they have already attempted so large
a stride? To one of which channels, or rather to a confluence of
both, we seem to be fast gliding away; and the moment we arrive
at it-farewell liberty. . . .
To conclude, I can think of but one source of right to government, or any branch of it-and that is THE PEOPLE. They, and
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only they, have a right to determine whether they will make laws,
or execute them, or do both in a collective body, or by a delegated
authority. Delegation is a positive actual investiture. Therefore if
any people are subjected to an authority which they have not thus
actually chosen-even though they may have tamely submitted to
it-yet it is not their legitimate government. They are wholly passive, and as far as they are so, are in a state of slavery. Thank heaven
we are not yet arrived at that state. And while we continue to have
sense enough to discover and detect, and virtue en(>ugh to detest
and oppose every attempt, either of force or fraud, either from
without or within, to bring us into it, we never will.
Let us therefore continue united in the cause of rational liberty. Let unity and liberty be our mark as well as our motto. For
only such an union can secure our freedom; and division will inevitably destroy it. Thus a mountain of sand may peace meal [sic] be
removed by the feeble hands of a child; but if consolidated into a
rock, it mocks the united efforts of mankind, and can only fall in a
general wreck of nature.
Republicus.

Document 6
Amendment 12
Manner of Choosing a President and Vice-President
This Amendment altered Article 2 Section 1 Part 2
Passed by Congress December 9, 1803. Ratified July 27, 1804.
1. The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by
ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least,
shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they
shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and of the
number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States,
directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate
shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,
open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; - The
person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be
the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from
the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the
list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives
shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing
the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation
from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and
a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the
House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right
of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next
following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of the
death or other constitutional disability of the President. (The words in
italics were superseded by Amendment XX)
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3. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such numbers be a majority of
the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate
shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall
consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be
eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

Documents 7
Timothy Pickering, Speech in Favor of
the Twelfth Amendement
Timothy Pickering, [Speech in favor of the twelfth amendment], circa
October 17, 1803. (The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History,
GLC05321.02)
Mr Speaker -,
The People, by their Electors shall elect the President, this is undoubtedly the meaning and the true constriction given the Constitution,- then to carry this fully into effect is doubtless pursuing
the wishes of the framers of that Instrument: - and I contend that
the Amendment under consideration is calculated to accomplish
this object and without this amendment, a person not having the
confidence of the Nation may be elected - can it be said with this
contingent, that the Constitution will inspire so full confidence as
if [inserted: the] difficulty was removed. -Confidence in a Republican government is important, confidence cannot be placed in such
a government if the majority cannot govern. - , But, Sir, we are
told that certain great States are determined to use up all authority
and bear down the constitution; that the very place where we are
now [at] is to become Virginia property, and therefore we must
not tutch that sacred instrument the constitution. - and, Sir if this
be so: Suppose at the time of the late Presidental [sic] election, no
President had been elected untill after the fourth of March - who
would answer for the consequences? would not the great States
then have refused (in agreeing to a new Constitution which must
then have been formed) to give the small States an equal vote with
the larger in the Senate, - and this precious article in the present
Constitution cannot ever be altered - privelages enjoyid under the
present constitution are much greater than could be expected were

a new Constitution now to be formed, - to prevent the Constitution
from running out by the present amendment is of more importance
to the Small States, than can possibly ever be gained to them by, electing a President under the Constitution as it now is. –
[2] I believe, Sir we outfit not to calculate to turn, or have a wish
for the election of a President, in any other way than by the Electors,
for without this popular privelage the constitution would not have
been adopted - again four small States which send but Eight members to the House of representatives have a right to Sixteen votes for
President while a great State, having a right to send say from 18 to 25
Members can add but two to her number in the choice of a President
is [inserted: not] this advantage great enough for small States in that
particular, under such an institution. -, On the subject of innovation,
great clamour is made. I am not infavor of innovation or amendments except for important and mighty considerations; - but were
not amendments expected: most certainly they were expected and I
will venture & say that without this provision, the constitution would
never have been adopted. - And will any Gent.n Say that amendments
have as yet injured the constitution: it is a well known fact that the
amendments already incorporated into the constitution have greatly
increased its friends. - One Gentn afraid this amendment will also
increase its friends, and stability and in that way prevent and destroy a
favorite object with [Lernes], namly , a division of the Union between
the northern and southern States}- I will not accuse any gentn. In
this house with such base motion but Sir I believe there are men base
enough in New England to wish for such a measure., Under an impression that the proposed amendment if adopted will give Stability
and duration to the Constitution I shall give it my hearty support - ,
[docket], Legislature 1804

Document 8
James Madison to George Hay
from The Writings of James Madison. Edited by Gaillard Hunt. 9 vols.
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900-1910.
23 Aug. 1823
I have received your letter of the 11th, with the Newspapers containing your remarks on the present mode of electing a President,
and your proposed remedy for its defects. I am glad to find you
have not abandoned your attention to great Constitutional topics.
The difficulty of finding an unexceptionable process for appointing the Executive Organ of a Government such as that of the U.S.
was deeply felt by the Convention; and as the final arrangement of
it took place in the latter stage of the Session, it was not exempt
from a degree of the hurrying influence produced by fatigue and
impatience in all such Bodies, tho’ the degree was much less than
usually prevails in them.
The part of the arrangement which casts the eventual appointment on the House of Reps. voting by States, was, as you presume, an accommodation to the anxiety of the smaller States for
their sovereign equality, and to the jealousy of the larger towards
the cumulative functions of the Senate. The agency of the H. of
Reps. was thought safer also than that of the Senate, on account
of the greater number of its members. It might indeed happen
that the event would turn on one or two States having one or two
Reps. only; but even in that case, the representations of most of
the States being numerous, the House would present greater obstacles to corruption than the Senate with its paucity of Members.
It may be observed also, that altho’ for a certain period the evil
of State votes given by one or two individuals would be extended
by the introduction of new States, it would be rapidly diminished
by growing populations within extensive territories. At the present
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period, the evil is at its maximum. Another Census will leave none
of the States existing or in Embryo, in the numerical rank of R.I. &
Del, nor is it impossible, that the progressive assimilation of local
Institutions, laws & manners, may[Volume 3, Page 557] overcome
the prejudices of those particular States against an incorporation
with their neighbours.
But with all possible abatements the present rule of voting
for President by the H. of Reps. is so great a departure from the
Republican principle of numerical equality, and even from the federal rule which qualifies the numerical by a State equality, and is
so pregnant also with a mischievous tendency in practice, that an
amendment of the Constitution on this point is justly called for by
all its considerate & best friends.
I agree entirely with you in thinking that the election of Presidential Electors by districts, is an amendment very proper to be
brought forward at the same time with that relating to the eventual
choice of President by the H. of Reps. The district mode was mostly, if not exclusively in view when the Constitution was framed and
adopted; & was exchanged for the general ticket & the legislative
election, as the only expedient for baffling the policy of the particular States which had set the example. A constitutional establishment of that mode will doubtless aid in reconciling the smaller
States to the other change which they will regard as a concession
on their part. And it may not be without a value in another important respect. The States when voting for President by general tickets or by their Legislatures, are a string of beads; when they make
their elections by districts, some of these differing in sentiment
from others, and sympathizing with that of districts in other States,
they are so knit together as to break the force of those geographical
and other noxious parties which might render the repulsive too
strong for the cohesive tendencies within the Political System.
It may be worthy of consideration whether in requiring elections by districts, a discretion might not be conveniently left with
the States to allot two members to a single district. It would manifestly be an important proviso, that no new arrangement of districts should be made within a certain period previous to an ensuing election of President.
Of the different remedies you propose for the failure of a
majority of Electoral votes for any one Candidate, I like best that
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which refers the final choice, to a joint vote of the two Houses
of Congress, restricted to the two highest names on the Electoral
lists. It might be a question, whether the three instead of the two
highest names might not be put within the choice of Congress,
inasmuch as it not unfrequently happens, that the Candidate third
on the list of votes would in a question with either of the two first
outvote him, and, consequently be the real preference of the voters. But this advantage of opening a wider door & a better chance
to merit, may be outweighed by an increased difficulty in obtaining a prompt & quiet decision by Congress with three candidates
before them, supported by three parties, no one of them making a
majority of the whole.
The mode which you seem to approve, of making a plurality
of Electoral votes a definitive appointment would have the merit
of avoiding the Legislative agency in appointing the Executive; but
might it not, by multiplying hopes and chances, stimulate intrigue
& exertion, as well as incur too great a risk of success to a very
inferior candidate? Next to the propriety of having a President the
real choice of a majority of his Constituents, it is desirable that he
should inspire respect & acquiescence by qualifications not suffering too much by comparison.
I cannot but think also that there is a strong objection to undistinguishing votes for President & Vice President; the highest
number appointing the former the next the latter. To say nothing
of the different services (except in a rare contingency) which are to
be performed by them, occasional transpositions would take place,
violating equally the mutual consciousness of the individuals, &
the public estimate of their comparative fitness.
Having thus made the remarks to which your communication led, with a frankness which I am sure you will not disapprove,
whatever errors you may find in them, I will sketch for your consideration a substitute which has occurred to myself for the faulty
part of the Constitution in question
“The Electors to be chosen in districts, not more than two in
any one district, and the arrangement of the districts not to be alterable within the period of ------ previous to the election of President. Each Elector to give two votes, one naming his first choice,
the other his next choice. If there be a majority of all the votes on
the first list for the same person, he of course to be President; if
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not, and there be a majority, (which may well happen) on the other
list for the same person, he then to be the final choice; if there be
no such majority on either list, then a choice to be made by joint
ballot of the two Houses of Congress, from the two names having
the greatest number of votes on the two lists taken together.” Such
a process would avoid the inconvenience of a second resort to the
Electors; and furnish a double chance of avoiding an eventual resort to Congress. The same process might be observed in electing
the Vice President.
Your letter found me under some engagements which have
retarded a compliance with its request, and may have also rendered
my view of the subject presented in it more superficial than I have
been aware. This consideration alone would justify my wish not to
be brought into the public discussion. But there is another in the
propensity of the Moment, to view everything, however abstract
from the Presidential election in prospect, thro’ a medium connecting it with that question; a propensity the less to be excused as
no previous change of the Constitution can be contemplated, and
the more to be regretted, as opinions and commitments formed
under its influence, may become settled obstacles at a practicable
season.

Document 9
James Madison to John Hillhouse
from The Writings of James Madison. Edited by Gaillard Hunt. 9 vols.
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900-1910.
Montpr
May 1830.
Dear Sir
I have received your letter of the 10th inst: with the pamphlet containing the proposed amendments of the Constitution of the U.
States, on which you request my opinion & remarks.
Whatever pleasure might be felt in a fuller compliance with
your request, I must avail myself of the pleas of the age I have
reached, and of the controul of other engagements, for not venturing on more than the few observations suggested by a perusal of
what you have submitted to the public.
I readily acknowledge the ingenuity which devised the plan
you recommend, and the strength of reasoning [367] with which
you support it. I cannot however but regard it as liable to the following remarks:
1. The first that occurs is, that the large States would not exchange
the proportional agency they now have in the appointment of the
Chief Magistrate, for a mode placing the largest & smallest States
on a perfect equality in that cardinal transaction. N. York has in it,
even now more than 13 times the weight of several of the States,
and other States according to their magnitudes wd decide on the
change with correspondent calculations & feelings.
The difficulty of reconciling the larger States to the equality in the Senate is known to have been the most threatning that
was encountered in framing the Constitution. It is known also that
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the powers committed to that body, comprehending, as they do,
Legislative, Ex. & Judicial functions, was among the most serious
objections, with many, to the adoption of the Constitution.
2. As the President elect would generally be without any previous
evidence of national confidence, and have been in responsible relations only to a particular State, there might be danger of State
partialities, and a certainty of injurious suspicions of them.
3. Considering the ordinary composition of the Senate, and the
number (in a little time nearly 50) out of which a single one was to
be taken by pure chance; it must often happen, that the winner of
the prize would want some of the qualities necessary to command
the respect of the nation, and possibly be [368] marked with some
of an opposite tendency. On a review of the composition of that
Body thro’ the successive periods of its existence, (antecedent to
the present which may be an exception) how often will names present themselves, which would be seen with mortified feelings at the
head of the nation. It might happen, it is true, that, in the choice of
Senators, an eventual elevation to that important trust might produce more circumspection in the State Legislatures. But so remote
a contingency could not be expected to have any great influence;
besides that there might be States not furnishing at the time, characters which would satisfy the pride and inspire the confidence of
the States & of the People.
4. A President not appointed by the nation and without the weight
derived from its selection & confidence, could not afford the advantage expected from the qualified negative on the act of the
Legislative branch of the Govt. He might either shrink from the
delicacy of such an interposition, or it might be overruled with too
little hesitation by the body checked in its career.
5. In the vicissitudes of party, adverse views & feelings will exist between the Senate & President. Under the amendments proposed,
a spirit of opposition in the former to the latter would probably
be more frequent than heretofore. In such a state of things, how
apt might the Senate be to embarrass the President, by refusing to
concur in the removal of an obnoxious officer; how prone would be
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a refractory [369] officer, having powerful friends in the Senate, to
take shelter under that authority, & bid defiance to the President;
and, with such discord and anarchy in the Ex. Department, how
impaired would be the security for a due execution of the Laws!
6. On the supposition that the above objection would be overbalanced by the advantage of reducing the power and the patronage
now attached to the Presidential office; it has generally been admitted, that the Heads of Depts at least who are at once the associates & the organs of the Chief Magistrate, ought to be well
disposed towards him, and not independent of him. What would
be the situation of the President, and what might be the effect on
the Executive business, if those immediately around him, and in
daily consultation with him, could, however adverse to him in their
feelings & their views, be fastened upon him, by a Senate disposed
to take side with them? The harmony so expedient between the P.
& Heads of Departments, and among the latter themselves, has
been too liable to interruption under an organization apparently
so well providing against it.
I am aware that some of these objections might be mitigated, if
not removed; but not I suspect in a degree to render the proposed
modification of the Executive Department an eligible substitute
for the one existing. At the same time, I am duly sensible of the
evils incident to the existing one, and that a solid improvement of
it is a desideratum that ought to be welcomed by all enlightened
patriots.
In the mean time, I cannot feel all the alarm you express at
the prospect for the future as reflected from the mirror of the past.
It will be a rare case that the Presidential contest will not issue in a
choice that will not discredit the station, and not be acquiesced in
by the unsuccessful party, foreseeing, as it must do, the appeal to
be again made at no very distant day to the will of the nation. As
long as the country shall be exempt from a military force powerful
in itself and combined with a powerful faction, liberty & peace will
find safeguards in the elective resource and the spirit of the people.
The dangers which threaten our political system least remote are
perhaps of other sorts and from other sources.
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I will only add to these remarks, what is indeed sufficiently
evident, that they are too hasty & too crude for any other than a
private, and that an indulgent eye.
Mrs. M. is highly gratified by your kind expressions towards
her, & begs you to be assured that she still feels for you that affectionate friendship with which you impressed her many years ago.
Permit me to join her in best wishes for your health & every other
happiness.
James Madison
May 1830 Montpellier
M. L. Hurlbert
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